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In recent ye a rs there is a growing interest in starting entre p re n e u rs.
Starting entre p re n e u rs play an important role in the business dyna-
mics and the quickly changing economy. From this pers p e c t i ve poli-
t i c i a n s,  policy - m a ke rs,  financial  institutions  and  re s e a rc h e rs  pay
m o re attention to this target group. Re s t a r t e rs, who start a business
again after a business failure, form a part of this target group. It is an
i n t e resting group, as one of the results of re s e a rch among starters is
that the survival rate of starters with experience is higher than the
s u r v i val rate of starters without ex p e r i e n c e. It is evident that the re-
s t a r t e rs, who start again after a business failure, have a lot of ex p e-
rience and should have learned many lessons. Neve r t h e l e s s, it seems
that the attitude towa rds entre p re n e u rs who have failed in their busi-
ness ve n t u re is more negative in the Netherlands than in other coun-
tries like the USA and this can hamper the attitude and willingness
of entre p re n e u rs to start again
1.
This publication deals with bankruptcies and failures and obstacles
for restarting after business failure. Besides the aforementioned is-
s u e s, it is also of importance from different pers p e c t i ves of stake h o l-
d e rs. First of all, a business failure is in general a very radical chan-
ge for an entre p reneur as it destroys human and physical capital
which has been invested in the enterprise. Employees are also heav i-
ly  invo l ved  as  they  lose  their  job  and  there f o re  their  income.
Fu r t h e r m o re, cre d i t o rs like banks, suppliers and tax authorities are
l i kely  to  re c e i ve only  a  small amount  of what  is  owed  to them.
S e c o n d l y, a business failure is, for many entre p re n e u rs and employ-
ees invo l ved in a bankruptcy, also disastrous in terms of social sta-
t u s. Third l y, will it be possible for an entre p reneur to start again after
a business failure ?
Chapter 2 of this publication is mainly devoted to the chapter on
bankruptcies and failures as published in the Fifth Annual Report of
the European Observatory for SMEs
2. This chapter deals with con-
cepts and definitions, rescue possibilities and quantative data con-
cerning bankruptcies and failures in European countries. 
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1 E c o nomisch Bureau Ing, Ondernemers op herhaling (Entrepreneurs on retraining exercises),
A ms t e rdam, 1998.
2 E u ropean Network for SME Research, Fifth Annual Report of the European Observatory for SMEs,
Ne t he r l a nd s, 1997. The chapter on bankruptcies and fa i l u res was co-ord i nated by OBSERVA
( S w i t z e r l a nd ) .The results of re s e a rch in the USA is presented in chapter 3
1. This
re s e a rch in the USA tried to provide answe rs on four main questions:
1 . Does a significant proportion of entre p re n e u rs in the United States
found  new  start-up  companies  despite  previous  experience  of
business failure? The latter is taken to mean the forced closure of
a business through bankruptcy or insolve n cy.
2 . What barriers are faced by entre p re n e u rs with previous ex p e r i-
ence  of  failure  when  they  attempt  to  start  new  businesses?
B a r r i e rs could include difficulties in obtaining credit or finance,
b u re a u c ratic or legal hindra n c e s, social stigma and so on.
3 . A l t e r n a t i ve l y, is learning lessons from business failure seen as a
p o s i t i ve factor in the United States?
4 . With re g a rd to bankruptcy and entre p re n e u rship, what chara c t e r-
istics of society and the economy in the United States are most
f avo u rable or unfavo u rable in determining the ability of individu-
als to start again and found new businesses?
In the Netherlands re s e a rch on entre p re n e u rs who restart again after
b a n k r u p t cy and the obstacles related to this is limited. Howeve r, some
i n t e resting  reports  on these  topics  have  been  published  re c e n t l y
2.
Chapter 4 provides the results of an analysis of the afore m e n t i o n e d
issues in the Netherlands on the basis of these re p o r t s. Fu r t h e r m o re,
comparisons between  the Dutch  and American situation  are pre-
sented in this chapter.
The publication ends with the conclusions in chapter 5.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
1 T he re s e a rch in the USA was carried out by Mic ro no m ics (USA) in commission of EIM Sma l l
B u s i ness Research and Cons u l t a nc y.
2 E c o nomisch Bureau Ing, Ondernemers op herhaling (Entrepreneurs on retraining exe r c i s e s ) ,
A ms t e rdam, 1998.
B&A  Groep,  Klaar  voor  de  herstart?  -  Onderzoek  naar  de  omstandigheden  van  bedrijfs -
beëindigers (Ready for the restart? - Research on the circumstances of business terminators,
T he Ha g u e, May 1998.2 Business failures in the
E u ropean Union
2 . 1 Concepts and definitions
No internationally accepted definition of ‘bankruptcy’ ex i s t s. In some
countries the term is used to mean the declaration ‘insolve n cy’ of an
enterprise (e.g. France), in others to mean the ‘liquidation’ of the
enterprise following the initiation of an insolve n cy pro c e d u re (e. g .
Austria). In order to avoid any misinterpretation the terms ‘insolve n-
cy declaration’, ‘rescue measures’ and ‘liquidation proceedings’ will
be used instead of ‘bankruptcy’ wherever possible.
F ig u re 2.1 T he o re t ical conc e p t ual fra me w o r k
S o u rce: Observa.
F i g u re 2.1 puts ‘bankruptcy’ in the context of the economic and legal
p rocesses to which it belongs. It suggests, among other things, that
rescue possibilities may be offered at different stages of the pro c e s s.
It also shows that a situation of distress can lead to closure without
losses  to  third  parties  and  without  insolve n cy  pro c e e d i n g s.
Depending on national legislation, insolve n cy can lead either to com-
pulsory  liquidation  (as  in  Luxe m b o u rg),  or  to  rescue  (as,  in
Portugal). In most countries, howeve r, insolvent enterprises have the
possibility  of  opting  for a  rescue  package  and  delays  (as  in  the
N e t h e r l a n d s, and Belgium). The consequences for the enterprise of
being declared insolvent also vary among countries, but  seem to
depend on whether the enterprises have the possibility of being re s-
cued before such a declaration. In Iceland, for exa m p l e, an enterprise
can seek protection from cre d i t o rs – by payment suspension – when
t h ey feel the threat of insolve n cy; but should it fail to do so, and the
i n s o l ve n cy pro c e d u re be initiated, the enterprise will automatically
be liquidated.
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ond the scope of the above diagram – one has to stress that even the
legal liquidation of an enterprise does not necessarily coincide with
its economic dismantling. Some national laws – mostly where bank-
r u p t cy legislation has recently been revised – explicitly emphasise the
possibility of an insolvent enterprise, with appropriately re s t r u c t u re d
capital and staff , being sold as an entity. In Austria, the Netherlands,
G e r m a ny (a reform of 1996), Finland (1993), Portugal (1996), Fra n c e,
and to some extent in Norway, the sale of the business entity has been
d e c l a red the prime objective of liquidation pro c e d u re.
2 . 2 I n s o l ve n cy and liquidation in national
l e g i s l a t i o n
In Table 2.1 an attempt is made to classify a legal fra m ework accor-
ding to two criteria:
1 . by the kind of balance it strikes between the competing stake hol-
d e rs groups; and 
2 . by the degree of intervention of the authorities in the pro c e e d i n g s.
2 . 2 . 1 Type of balance
Each legal system tries to strike a balance between the two – often
conflicting – interests of cre d i t o rs and the employe e s. The interest of
c re d i t o rs is to re c over their claims to assets, if necessary, by dis-
mantling the enterprise and selling it off piecemeal. Employe e s, by
c o n t rast, tend to favour the pre s e r vation of the business as a going
concern, even if some of the claims of cre d i t o rs have to be aban-
doned to the latter’s detriment.
The late payment problem lies exactly at the cro s s - roads of the dilem-
ma with which legislation is confronted. A legal fra m ework facilitating
the ultimate or even temporary postponement of commercial debts
p rotects  insolvent  enterprises,  but,  indire c t l y,  encourages  late  pay-
ment. A recent study argues that this in turn hinders growth in some
four out of ten SMEs and even threatens the survival of one third of
e n t e r p r i s e s
1. This analysis suggests that the interests of cre d i t o rs and
of the enterprise tend to conve rge rather than conflict when the scope
of analysis is raised from the micro- to the macro-economic level. 
Despite the above issues, laws are designed to function at a specific
l evel. In consequence each legal system strikes a different balance
b e t ween cre d i t o rs’  and  enterprise’s  interests  and  adopts  differe n t
means to achieve it.
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1 I ntrum Justitia, European Payment Habits, Survey, Ams t e rdam 1997.9
Business failures in the European Union
Table 2.1 Main chara c t e r i s t ics of na t io nal bankruptcy legislatio n
D e g ree of  I nt e rests 
C o u nt r y i nt e r v e nt io n p ro t e c t e d J u s t i f ic a t ion of the classific a t io n
Au s t r ia X X X both enterprise  Compulsory pre v e ntive me a s u res with early warning ra t ios Va r io u s
survival and  re o rg a n i s a t ion me a s u re s. Under liquida t ion the e nterprise is  sold 
c re d. int e re s t . as a who l e, pro v ided this is feasible. 
B e l g i u m XX  e nterprise survival  P re v e ntive me a s u res  exist  (Commission  for  Pre v e ntive Enterprise 
p o l icy).Definitive postpone me nt of debt is possible. Reorg a n i s a t io n
is possible with ma na ge me nt assistanc e.
D e n mark  XX  c reditor’s int e rests  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. Debtor must find agre e me nt within 3-5
mo nt hs  to  avoid  liquida t ion.  Severe  personal  cons e q u e nc e s.
C o m p o s i t ion and re o rg a n i s a t ion are possible.
F i n l a nd  XX  c reditor’s int e rest  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. Reorg a n i s a t ion is possible but only to
p rotect int e rests of cre d i t o r s.
F ra nce  XXX  e nterprise survival P re v e ntive me a s u res exist. Three differe nt rescue sche mes are avail-
a b l e, one of which is a re o rg a n i s a t ion plan. May last up to 15 years.
G e r ma ny  X (X) u ntil 1996 cre d. fro m No  pre v e ntive  me a s u re s.  Reorg a n i s a t ion  is  possible.  Legal 
1996 ent. survival  f ra mework  changed  in  1996.  Until  then,  enterprises  were  sold
p ie c e meal at short no t ic e. The goal of new legislation is to keep the
e nterprise intact for as long as possible.
G re e c e X  c reditor’s int e rest  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. In case of ins o l v e nc y, in 95% of cases
f i xed assets are sold.
I re l a nd  XX  both ent. survival No  pre v e ntive  me a s u re s.  Reorg a n i s a t ion  under  the  cont ro l
a nd creditor’s int e re s t of a Receiver is possible. But main objective to ens u re debts are
p a id. The re fo re part or all of assets may be sold.
Italy  XX  both ent. survival  No  pre v e ntive  me a s u re s.  Reorg a n i s a t ion  is  possible  if  court
a nd creditor’s int e re s t c o ns iders crisis tempora r y. If not, enterprise is liquida t e d.
L u xe m b o u rg  X  c reditor’s int e rest  No pre v e ntive  me a s u re s. Pe r s o nal  cons e q u e nces for  owner are
s e v e re. No re o rg a n i s a t ion plan. Liquida t ion follows quickly in case
of ins o l v e nc y.
Ne t he r l a nd s X X X e nterprise survival  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. Mo re than one creditor is ne e ded to ini-
t iate a pro c e du re against an ent e r p r i s e. Rescue and re o rg a n i s a-
t ion possibilities are nu me ro u s.
Portugal  XXX  e nterprise survival  No  pre v e ntive  me a s u re s.  Substant ial  support  if potent ial cash
flow is positive. Four rescue and re o rg a n i s a t ion possibilities are
a v a i l a b l e.
S w e den  XXX  c reditor’s int e rest  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. A creditor may ask for  the claim en-
fo rc e me nt service even befo re a de c l a ra t ion of ins o l v e nc y, i.e.
w i t hout waiting until all claima nts are known. Rescue is possible.
Spain  XXX  both ent. survival  P re v e ntive  me a s u res  exist.  Severe  personal  cons e q u e nc e s.
a nd creditor’s int e re s t If lia b i l i t ies are greater than the assets, the enterprise is liquida-
ted – unless the re is an agre e me nt with cre d i t o r s. Int e r v e nt io n
by re g io nal go v e r n me nt is possible.
United Kingdom  XX  both ent. survival  P re v e ntive  me a s u res  exist.  One  objective  is  to  push
a nd creditor’s int e re s t a dm i n i s t rators to apply for assistanc e. Rescue possibilities ex i s t .
Adm i n i s t rators may  be  dismissed (CCDA)  and ma de persona l l y
re s p o ns i b l e.
Ic e l a nd  XX  c reditor’s int e rests  P re v e ntive me a s u res exist. The enterprise may ask for postpone-
me nt of debt befo re legal ins o l v e nc y, but when a creditor opens
t he pro c e e d i ngs the enterprise is liquida t e d.
L ie c ht e nstein  XX  c reditor’s int e rests  No  pre v e ntive  me a s u re s.  Po s t p o ne me nt  of  debts  is  possible,
Adm i n i s t rator may run the busine s s
Norway  XXX  c reditor’s int e rests  P re v e ntive me a s u res exist. The enterprise may ask for postpone-
me nt of debt befo re the legal ins o l v e nc y, but as soon as a cre d i-
tor opens the pro c e e d i ngs the enterprise is liquida t e d.
S w i t z e r l a nd  XX  e nterprise survival  No pre v e ntive me a s u re s. Reorg a n i s a t ion is possible with a two years’
p o s t p o ne me nt of de b t s. An adm i n i s t rator may run the busine s s.
S o u rce: Observa – Compiled on the basis of the info r ma t ion pro v ided by ENSR partne r s.2 . 2 . 2 The degree of interve n t i o n
The degree to which the public authorities are invo l ved in the bank-
r u p t cy pro c e d u re is a significant issue as intervention may imply
high direct and indirect costs, and may induce distortions in compe-
tition, favouring enterprises that benefit from rescue packa g e s. In
Table 2.1 we denote a low level of intervention by ‘X’ defined as
when the authorities do not interfere with the operations of the insol-
vent enterprise and restrict their role to a purely legal interve n t i o n .
We denote a high level of intervention by ‘XXX’, defined as when the
state grants support to insolvent enterprises through advice or re o r-
ganisation, or in some other form.
Table 2.1 shows that it is ra re for countries to protect cre d i t o rs’ and
e n t e r p r i s e ’s interests to the same extent. It also indicates that coun-
tries have re l a t i vely sophisticated forms of legislation, indicated by
the high level of intervention (and correspondingly high costs) of
public administra t i o n .
2 . 3 Rescue possibilities
Rescue possibilities may take a number of forms that extend from the
most common, namely, a temporary postponement of debts, to the
least  common,  a  ten  year  restructuring  plan.  In  Iceland,
L u xe m b o u rg, Austria,  Fra n c e,  the  Netherlands, Belgium, Swe d e n ,
N o r way, and Germany  rescue is available even before  the actual
i n s o l ve n cy  declaration.  Indeed,  by  asking  for  a  moratorium,  the
enterprise  in  difficulty is temporarily protected, partially  or  com-
p l e t e l y,  against  the  claims  of  cre d i t o rs.  In  most  cases,  however 
– typically in Italy, Denmark, Spain, Finland – the rescue plan follows
an insolve n cy declaration. New laws tend to make the rescue options
available at different phases of the liquidation pro c e e d i n g s. In some
cases rescue is even possible – but under very specific circumstances –
after the decision to liquidate has been taken. 
M o ra t o r i u m
A temporary debt moratorium is the most frequently encountere d
m e a s u re and exists in almost all countries. For example in Germany
it  is  known  as  the  Ve rg l e i c h s v e r f a h re n,  in  Liechtenstein  the
N a c h l a s s t u n d u n g, in Luxe m b o u rg the c o n c o rdat préventif à la failli -
t e, in Iceland the G reidslustödvun, in Norway the T v a n g s a k k o rd, i n
Belgium the a g reement, in the Netherlands the moratorium, in Spain
the  suspension  de  pagos,  in  Austria  the  Ausgleich  bzw.
Zwangsausgleich, in Switzerland the s u rsis concord a t a i re, in Finland
1 0
Business failures in the European Unionand France the règlement à l’amiable and in Italy the a m m i n i s t ra t i o -
ne contro l a t a .
Re o rg a n i s a t i o n
E f f e c t i ve re o rganisation measures following a formally approved plan
a re more infrequent. A few countries apply such measure s. These
include Belgium (a g reement  pro c e d u re), Finland (v e l k a s a n e e ra u s) ,
France (re d re s s e m e n t), Netherlands (t h ro u g h s t a r t), Portugal (g e s t a o
c o n t ro l a d a). Austria has recently implemented a new measure called
Re o rg a n i s a t i o n s v e r f a h re n – commencing in 1997 – which intro d u c e s
the concept of early warning ra t i o s. Enterprises not satisfying these
ra t i o - d r i ven criteria are obliged to re o rganise even before they beco-
me insolvent. Experience will demonstrate whether the benefits of
this system are higher than its administra t i ve costs.
After a re o rganisation plan has been decided upon, the enterprise
has a reasonable time  to  adapt  itself to  the  plan’s  re q u i re m e n t s.
During this period debts are frozen or need not be fully repaid. The
d u ration of the plan is variable; it can be as short as 2 ye a rs (as in
Portugal) or as high as 10 ye a rs (as in France). These measures imply
the  supervision  of  an  external  tutor  or  adviser.  In  the  case  of
Belgium, the commissioner appointed has to be familiar with the
management of enterprises and with bookkeeping. Howeve r, in pra c-
tice it proves difficult to attract highly qualified professionals to take
up these jobs. In consequence the organisational measures do not
supply the necessary valuable external advice.
External advice
Recent trends in bankruptcy legislation invo l ve the support of enter-
prises in difficulty by the provision of advice. Most of the countries
c reating new legislation in the last three ye a rs have adopted this
a p p roach (e.g. Finland, Fra n c e, Portugal and Switzerland). Similar
m oves are also currently observable in Germany and Au s t r i a .
Re o rganisation in Finland: ‘ve l ka s a n e e raus’  
T he purpose of Finland’s Reorg a n i s a t ion law is to pro v ide a legal fra mework for econo-
m ically viable enterprises to avoid ‘unnecessary’ bankruptcy. The of f ic ia l / a dm i n i s t ra t o r
is expected to propose a plan within four mo nt hs to deal with the situa t ion. This re o r-
g a n i s a t ion plan consists of a stateme nt of the cond i t io ns of the business and a re v ie w
of the opera t io ns du r i ng the planned period of re o rg a n i s a t ion. If the company canno t
follow the re o rg a n i s a t ion plan, the re o rg a n i s a t ion pro c e du re may be discont i nued or a
r u l i ng on the enterprise may be ma de in bankruptcy.
1 1
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Evidence from Austria shows that in 1996, 63% of rescue pro c e d u-
res resulted in the re c overy of the enterprise. Howeve r, this success
rate should not be ex t rapolated to other countries. Austria, which has
four  different  rescue  measure s,  has  a  particularly  high  degree  of
public intervention. It is there f o re particularly difficult to evaluate the
success of recent legislative changes – especially the introduction of
advice – because of both their newness and complex i t y.
2 . 4 Q u a n t a t i ve data
2 . 4 . 1 C l o s u re s
The Fourth Annual  Report  of the European Observatory for SME
s h owed that the economic meaning of the term ‘exit’ is far from har-
monised across the countries of Europe-19 (see Figure 2.1). ‘Closure ’
f i g u res may cover simply ‘liquidation’ or encompass any kind of for-
mal dissolution of an enterprise; for exa m p l e, through changes in the
business’ name or legal form. This latter definition applies to Au s t r i a ,
Belgium, Finland, Italy, Luxe m b o u rg, Liechtenstein and Sw i t z e r l a n d .
Despite these cave a t s, some statistical findings can be stated: 
• ‘Liquidations’ re p resent only 15% to 20% of closure s ;
• The broader the definition of ‘closure’ the greater the pro p o r t i o n
of closures to the total enterprise population. The closure ra t e
varies greatly among countries ranging from 13% in Germany to
1% in Portugal, Spain and Luxe m b o u rg ;
• High closure rates accompany high birth ra t e s, mainly because
national definitions are usually either rather broad or rather nar-
row. For this reason the net closure ra t e s
1 a c ross countries lie in a
n a r rower range between –1% (Iceland) and +4% (Germany and
the Netherlands).
2 . 4 . 2 Trends in insolve n cy and liquidation since
the 1980s
National statistics are collected at various stages of the legal pro c e e-
dings towa rds insolve n cy and liquidation, making them difficult to
c o m p a re. Countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Fra n c e, Gre e c e, Italy,
the Netherlands and Norway count commencements of insolve n cy
p ro c e d u res; whereas Finland, Ireland, Luxe m b o u rg, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Iceland report the number of actu-
al liquidations. Only Austria was able to provide a ‘full’ set of data
c overing insolve n cy openings, liquidations and rescue opera t i o n s.
1 2
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1 D e f i ned as births minus c l o s u re s.Austrian data show that more than one half of the insolve n cy pro-
ceedings  opened  are  dropped  because  of  insufficient  assets.  Fo r
G e r m a ny this re f e rs to almost 70% of the insolve n cy pro c e e d i n g s
opened. This suggests that in countries where only ‘liquidation’ figu-
res are compiled, the corresponding numbers are lower by some 50
units than  those  using ‘insolve n cy’  data, since there  are cases in
which insolve n cy does not lead to legal liquidation and claims are
d ropped. The same problem is encountered in data concerning asset
l o s s e s. Finally, the problem is even greater for job losses, since jobs
lost are counted at the moment of the formal liquidation, where a s
enterprises usually reduce their wo r k f o rce well in advance of this
eve n t .
Another statistical problem relating to comparisons of liquidation or
i n s o l ve n cy data arises from the fact that the treatment of self employ-
ed differs across countries. Thus insolvencies of the self employe d
m ay be counted either as insolve n cy of private persons or as insol-
ve n cy of enterprises. There f o re, in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 national data
of indexed growth rates (1980 = 100) are compared rather than
absolute numbers. 
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F ig u re 2.2 O p e n i ng of ins o l v e ncy pro c e e d i ng s, 1980-1996
S o u rc e s : I ns o l v e ncy: Au s t r ia: Statistics by Kre d i t s c hu t z v e r b a nd of 1870; Belgium: Gra y don Belgium; Fra nce: unt i l
1989 ANCE – Observatoire (opening of pro c e e d i ngs), from 1990 INSEE (revised opening of pro c e e d i ng s ) ;
G e r ma ny: Statistisches Bundesamt Wie s b a den, Greece: NSSG-Statistics of justice; Italy: Istat and Cerved









Austria France Greece Italy NetherlandsThe common perception of a correlation between the business cyc l e
and the volume of liquidation is corro b o rated in this data. Insolve n cy
and  Liquidation  both  rise sharply  with the  economic  slowd ow n .
H oweve r, numbers do not drop back significantly in recent upswings.
This fact may be explained by the growth of the stock of enterprises
in a re c overy: a constant volume of liquidations implies a fall in re l a-
t i ve terms, which is the quantity of interest. A long term study car-
ried out by INSEE of France analysing the reasons for failures fro m
1 8 20 to 1988 showed that the ave rage annual growth rate of insol-
ve n cy was of the order of 1.5%.
The relationship between the phases of the business cycle and liqui-
dation was apparent in most countries, but for reasons of space we
i l l u s t rate with a single exa m p l e, namely, that of Spain.
1 4
Business failures in the European Union
F ig u re 2.3 L i q u ida t io ns of enterprises indexed (1980=100), 1980-1996
S o u rc e s : L i q u ida t ion: Au s t r ia: Statistics by Kre d i t s c hu t z v e r b a nd of 1870; Finland: Small Business Database/Sma l l
B u s i ness Institute and Fede ra t ion of Finnish Ent reprises; Ire l a nd: Companies Report, published by Statio ne r y
O f f ic e, Dublin; Luxe m b o u rg: Mémo r ial STATEC; Portugal: MOPE; Spain: Instituto Na c io nal de Estatistic a ;














Switzerland2 . 4 . 3 C h a racteristics of insolvent and liquidated
e n t e r p r i s e s
As shown in Table 2.2, only a few countries we re able to provide data
on insolvencies and liquidations by size class. In all five cases, ve r y
small enterprises (up to 9 employees) re p resent the bulk of insol-
ve n cy or liquidation. This does not mean, howeve r, that very small
enterprises are more likely to fail than those in other size classes. On
the contra r y, the proportion of very small enterprises among insol-
vent and  liquidated  enterprises is  lower than their share  in total
enterprise population. Very small enterprises seem to be more re s i s-
tant to insolve n cy than small enterprises (with 10 to 49 employe e s ) .
In the Netherlands, very small enterprises comprise 90.5% of total
population whereas their share in total insolve n cy is only 80.9%. On
the other hand, small enterprises re p resent 7.5% of Dutch enter-
prises but 18.2% of insolvencies – more than double the pro p o r t i o n .
In  Italy  the  ratios  are  94.4%  and  83.4%  re s p e c t i ve l y.  The  only
country where the share of very small enterprises in liquidation is
higher than their proportion in the economy as a whole is Swe d e n .
The difference in this case is a mere 2.4%. 
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F ig u re 2.4 L i q u ida t ion and output gap in Spain, 1980-1995
S o u rce: Instituto Na c io nal de Estadistica, and OECD econo m ic outlook.






















Output gap in % LiquidationsSix  countries  we re  able  to  provide  information  about  the  age  of
liquidated  or  insolvent  enterprises,  and  Switzerland  provided  an
estimated  distribution.  With  the  exception  of  Portugal,  the  data
confirm that young enterprises are particularly at risk. Data fro m
Sweden,  Luxe m b o u rg  and  Denmark  provide  a  very  similar  age
distribution for liquidation or insolve n cy: 60% existed for less than
6 ye a rs, 30% to 40% existed for less than 3 ye a rs. In Germany 80%
of the liquidated or insolvent enterprises we re younger than 8 ye a rs.
In the Netherlands, 28% of the liquidated enterprises existed less
than 3 ye a rs, 54% less than 6 ye a rs and 64% less than 8 ye a rs. These
f i g u res suggest that the liquidated enterprises in the Netherlands are
s o m ewhat older than the liquidated enterprises in the countries men-
tioned before. But as data on the age distribution of the stock of
enterprises do not exist, it is not possible to state whether the age
distribution of failed enterprise differs from that of the total enter-
prise population.
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Table 2.2 I ns o l v e nc ies or liquida t io ns by size class, 1993
size class: number of employees
0/1 to 9 10 to 49 50 to 99 > 1 0 0 > 2 0 0 Un k no w n To t a l
Belgium, i ns o l v e nc ie s 5 , 6 3 7 4 3 1 4 3 2 4 6 , 1 3 5
% ins o l v e nc ies in size class 9 2 7 1 0 1 0 0 %
% enterprises in size class 9 6 3
F i n l a n d , l i q u ida t io ns 5 , 7 3 8 * 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 6 , 5 6 7
% ins o l v e nc ies in size class 8 7 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 %
% enterprises in size class 9 4 5
Italy, i ns o l v e nc ies (1994) 1 3 , 3 5 2 * * 2 , 3 4 4 2 3 2 * * * 8 8 1 6 , 0 1 6
% ins o l v e nc ies in size class 8 3 1 5 2 1 1 0 0 %
% enterprises in size class 9 4 5
N e t h e r l a n d s , i ns o l v e nc ie s 3 , 5 9 0 8 0 6 3 9 9 1 8 5 , 3 5 3
% ins o l v e nc ies in size class 8 1 1 8 1 1 0 0 % = 4 , 4 3 5
% enterprises in size class 9 1 8
S w e d e n , l i q u ida t io ns 1 7 , 4 5 7 1 , 1 3 7 8 9 4 1 1 8 , 7 2 4
% liquida t io ns in size class 9 3 6 0 0 1 0 0 %
% enterprises in size class 9 1 8
* F i n l a nd: size class is 1 to 9 employees, self employed are excepted from liquida t ion statistic s.
**  Italy: size class is 1 to 9 employees, self employed are excepted from ins o l v e ncy statistic s.
***  Italy: size class is 50 to 199 employees.
S o u rc e s : I ns o l v e ncy: Belgium: Gra y don Belgium; Italy: Istat and Cerved Data; Ne t he r l a nds: Cent raal Bureau voor de
S t a t i s t ie k
L i q u ida t ion:  Finland:  Small  Business  Database/Small  Business  Institute  and  Fede ra t ion  of  Finnish
E nt reprises; Sweden: Statistics Swede n .
Data on enterprises estimates by EIM Small Business Research and Cons u l t a nc y, adapted from Eurostat (DG
XXII). Enterprises in Euro p e, Fifth Report. Brussels/Luxe m b o u rg .The liquidation of enterprises which have existed over 50 ye a rs is not
f requent (4.97% in Portugal in 1996). This, howeve r, does not mean
that  SMEs  do  not  face  transmission  problems;  it  indicates  more
p robably that the  closure of  mature enterprises does not  lead  to
losses for third parties. There f o re, these cases do not enter the insol-
ve n cy statistics.
P r i vate liability  seems to  be a  deterrent to  insolve n cy.  In  conse-
q u e n c e, enterprises without private liability become insolvent earlier
in their existence than others. The different personal and financial
consequences  for  the owner  account  for  this fact. As many ve r y
small  enterprises  are  based  on  unlimited  liability,  their  under-
re p resentation in the set of insolvent enterprises may be explained by
their legal form.
2 . 4 . 4 I n s o l vencies and bankruptcies by sector
As shown in Table 2.3 manufacturing and construction enterprises
h ave in recent ye a rs been more prone to insolve n cy and liquidation
than those of the service sector. In some countries, howeve r, – for
exa m p l e, Portugal and Greece – there are re l a t i vely few construction
enterprises  in  financial  difficulty,  whilst  in  others  (e.g.  Au s t r i a )
almost all liquidations take place in the service sector.
F i n a l l y, a comparison is made between the number of insolve n c i e s
or liquidations and the number of enterprises. When interpreting the
results one has to keep in mind that national statistics are collected
at various stages of the legal proceedings towa rds insolve n cy and
liquidation,  making  them difficult  to  compare. Countries such as
Belgium,  Denmark,  Fra n c e,  Gre e c e,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and
N o r way count commencements of insolve n cy pro c e d u res; where a s
Finland, Ireland, Luxe m b o u rg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom and Iceland report the number of actual liquidations. Also
the treatment of self employed differs among countries as they may
be  counted  as  insolve n cy  of  private  persons  or  as  insolve n cy  of
e n t e r p r i s e s. As can be seen in table 2.4, the differences in the num-
ber  of  insolvencies  or  liquidations  per  10,000  enterprises  va r i e s
enormously between the European countries from almost nothing in
Portugal and Spain to hundreds of insolvencies or liquidations per
10,000 enterprises in a number of countries.
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Business failures in the European UnionTable 2.4 I ns o l v e nc ies  and  bankruptcies  in  re l a t ion  to  the  stock  of
e nt e r p r i s e s
Total ins o l v e nc ies  Number of I ns o l v e nc ies or liquida t io ns
C o u nt r y or liquida t io ns e nt e r p r i s e s per 10,000 ent e r p r i s e s
Au s t r ia  1,732  2 3 1 , 2 0 0 7 5
Belgium  6,135  8 0 5 , 5 0 0 7 6
D e n mark (95)  1,718  246,000  7 0
F i n l a nd  6,566  181,400  3 6 2
F ra nce  60,476  2,014,800  3 0 0
G e r ma ny  12,821  3,180,200  4 0
G reece  996  549,600  1 8
Italy  15,592  3,253,800  4 8
L u xe m b o u rg  271  13,700  1 9 8
Ne t he r l a nds  5,353  595,900  9 3
Portugal  269  635,800  4
Spain  618  2 , 1 7 1 , 6 0 0 3
S w e den (95)  11,315  239,400  4 7 3
Ic e l a nd  442  22,100  2 0 0
Norway (95)  3,902  159,500  245  
S o u rce: see table 2.3.
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e n t re p re n e u rship in the USA
3 . 1 B a n k r u p t cy Legislation and
P ro c e d u re s
3 . 1 . 1 I n t ro d u c t i o n
The main purpose of bankruptcy legislation is to assist parties in eli-
minating debt in situations where they face ex t reme financial dis-
t re s s. Bankruptcy provides an opportunity to individuals and busi-
nesses to start fresh with no debt, albeit with a blemished credit his-
t o r y.
1 Parties filing for bankruptcy may find themselves in a va r i e t y
of situations. For this reason, there are three types of bankruptcy
re l evant to this discussion: Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.
All three chapters grant the debtor an automatic stay that allows the
entity in debt to avoid fore c l o s u re s, evictions and harassment by cre-
d i t o rs. The appropriate chapter of filing is based on criteria such as
the magnitude of debts and assets invo l ved and the form of the deb-
tor (individual or business). The type of business is also re l eva n t :
w h e re sole pro p r i e t o rships and general partnerships are concerned,
business ow n e rs are personally responsible for the businesses’ lia-
bilities and there f o re often file as individuals. Corpora t i o n s, mean-
while  are  separate  legal  entities  from  their  ow n e rs.  In  genera l ,
Chapter 7 is applicable to entities filing either as individuals or busi-
n e s s e s, Chapter 11 is applicable only to those filing as businesses,
and Chapter 13 is applicable to some small businesses but is mainly
for individuals.
3 . 1 . 2 Chapter 7
G e n e ral description
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code re f e rs to the liquidation of assets
to pay as many debts as possible. Most debts that that cannot be paid
a re discharged, freeing the debtor from liability. Any individual, part-
n e rship or corporation may file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. When indi-
viduals file under Chapter 7 but have sufficient assets to pay cre d i-
t o rs or the ability to re o rganize under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 plans,
their petitions can be dismissed or converted. Bankruptcy pro c e d u re s
can be voluntary or requested by cre d i t o rs.
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1 B u s i ness ent i t ies filing under Chapter 7 are, of course, liquidated and cease to ex i s t .P ro c e d u re s
The  Chapter  7  process  is  initiated  by  filing  a  petition  with  the
B a n k r u p t cy Court of the debtor’s district. Once this has taken place,
the debtor is granted an automatic stay of payment. The latter re f e rs
to an automatic injunction which halts any collection activity. The
debtor must then report assets, liabilities, cre d i t o rs and their re s p e c-
t i ve  claims,  income,  property  and  living  expenses  to  the  court.
Holdings not exempt from liquidation are placed under the control of
an appointed trustee, whose primary role is to provide the maximum
return to unsecured cre d i t o rs by liquidating assets.
Individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are typically ‘no asset’ cases,
with unsecured cre d i t o rs receiving no compensation for the debts
owed to them.
1 S e c u red cre d i t o rs typically repossess (or have handed
over) the assets that provided the collatera l .
2 If the value of these
assets is less than the debts owed (which is often the case), then the
d i f f e rence is simply written off. On occasion, a debtor and unsecur-
ed creditor may voluntarily agree for the former to continue making
p ayments on the secured loan or line of credit (most likely in re s p e c t
of a vehicle or real estate), albeit at what is likely to be at a written-
d own ra t e.
At the conclusion of a Chapter 7 case, individual debtors are left with
f ew assets but also no debt (even to secured cre d i t o rs )
3 B u s i n e s s
entities are terminated and cease to exist. Consequently, they have
no assets or liabilities re m a i n i n g .
3 . 1 . 3 Chapter 11
G e n e ral description
The chapter of the bankruptcy code that deals mainly with the re o r-
ganisation of a business is Chapter 11. In principal, a business filing
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy should be able to re p ay a greater pro p o r-
tion of its debts by remaining in business rather than liquidating
a s s e t s.  Chapter  11  gives  the debtor the  opportunity to  execute  a
re p ayment plan that eradicates debt over a period of time. A debtor
can willingly file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, or cre d i t o rs can file an
i n voluntary petition.
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1 A me r ican Bankruptcy Ins t i t u t e, Bankruptcy Overview: Issues, Law and Policy. Third editio n ,
1 9 9 7 .
2 In States whe re ho mes are exempt assets, lenders do not secure loans or credit on the re s i-
de nt ial property for obvious re a s o ns.
3 E xc e p t io ns inc l ude, inter alia, tax arrears (see section 4.1), child ma i nt e na nc e, amo u nts owed
in respect of stude nt loans and other lines of credit whe re the ind i v idual debtor has agre e d
v o l u ntarily to cont i nue ma k i ng payme nts to a secured cre d i t o r.P ro c e d u re s
Once a voluntary petition has been filed, an automatic stay goes into
effect. In involuntary cases, the debtor must file for an Order for
Relief before the stay is enacted. When the stay goes into effect, the
debtor becomes known as the debtor-in-possession. At this point, if
the debtor-in-possession wishes to propose a re o rganisation plan, a
d i s c l o s u re statement must be filed that provides adequate informa-
tion re g a rding the history of the debtor and the condition of the deb-
t o r ’s re c o rd s.
For the first 120 days after the stay is established, the debtor-in-pos-
session has the exc l u s i ve right to file a plan of re o rganisation. A total
of 180 days from the beginning of the stay is allowed for the debtor-
in-possession to have the plan approved. Howeve r, if no plan is sub-
mitted during the 120 - d ay period or no plan is approved during the
1 8 0 - d ay period, cre d i t o rs are given the opportunity to present the
court with alternate plans that may include liquidation. These time
periods can be extended or shortened according to the discretion of
the court. Fu r t h e r m o re, in the cases of businesses with less than 
$ 2,000,000 in aggregate debt at the filing of the petition, the exc l u-
sivity period to file a plan is 100 days, while the time for approval is
160 days from the date of bankruptcy filing or Order of Re l i e f .
The court makes the final decision to confirm or approve any pro-
posed plans. The court may also have to choose between competing
viable plans submitted by different parties. Upon confirmation, the
debtor must adhere to the provisions of the plan or risk having the
case dismissed or converted to Chapter 7. Plans for re p ayment set
out schedules, amounts to be paid to different cre d i t o rs and so on.
Re p ayment plans typically take months, if not ye a rs, to complete.
D e b t o rs remain under Chapter 11 protection until plans have been
c o m p l e t e d .
1
3 . 1 . 4 Chapter 13
G e n e ral description
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code targets parties that have a re g u-
lar income but are currently unable to pay their debts. Only indivi-
duals and small businesses with unsecured debts less than $ 250 , 0 0 0
and secured debts less that $ 750,000 are eligible for Chapter 13
relief. Debtors must submit a re p ayment plan to the court within 15
d ays of filing the bankruptcy petition. The duration of the re p ay m e n t
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1 Subject to the alre a dy noted proviso that if the terms of a plan are not met, the debtor risks
h a v i ng its case dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.period is three ye a rs, except for cases where the court grants a lon-
ger period up to a maximum of five ye a rs. Once a plan has been con-
firmed and executed, the debtor is discharged of most re m a i n i n g
d e b t .
P ro c e d u re s
The debtor files a petition and proposed re p ayment plan with the
B a n k r u p t cy Court in the region of the debtor’s re s i d e n c e. The party
in debt must also include a list of cre d i t o rs and the nature of claims,
p ro p e r t y, living expenses and source of income. Within 20 to 40 days
of the filing, a meeting of cre d i t o rs takes place. The trustee assigned
to the case and the debtor also attend this meeting. Unsecured cre d-
i t o rs then file claims within 90 days of this meeting. The plan usu-
ally must pay the full amounts of claims or commit to cre d i t o rs all
income not necessary for the survival of the debtor and dependents.
A confirmation hearing is held by the court, at which cre d i t o rs can
object to the plan. The most common objection is that the cre d i t o rs
would re c e i ve more money if the debtor was forced to liquidate as
delineated in Chapter 7. Upon confirmation of the plan, the debtor
must make payments to the trustee who distributes funds to cre d i-
t o rs. Fa i l u re to make payments can lead to dismissal or conve rsion to
Chapter 7.
3 . 2 Business Fa i l u re, Start-Ups and
S u r v i val – a Statistical Ove r v i ew
I n t ro d u c t i o n
T h e re are three main sources of data on business start-ups, failure s
and survival rates in the United States. These are Dun & Bra d s t re e t ,
the Small Business Ad m i n i s t ration and the Bankruptcy Yearbook &
A l m a n a c. This chapter provides a statistical ove r v i ew of key points
relating to the above topics using these and certain other sourc e s.
3 . 2 . 1 S t a r t - U p s
Ac c o rding to figures provided by Dun & Bra d s t reet, the total number
of new business start-ups in the United States in 1997 amounted to
166,740 (table 3.1).
1 These figures re p resented a decline of approx i-
mately 2.2% compared to 1996. As shown in table 3.1, over 50% of
these new start-ups had two or fewer employe e s. Thre e - q u a r t e rs had
no more than five employe e s.
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1 F ig u res ma de available by Dun & Bra d s t reet on the number of business start-ups are sub-
ject to a certain level of do w nw a rds bia s. This is because a business will not appear in Dun
& Bra d s t reet’s re c o rds unless a credit analysis is requested for it within three years of its
i nc e p t io n .Table 3.1 B u s i ness starts by employme nt size in the USA, 1996-1997
1996  1997  
Employees  F i r ms  Pe rc e nt  F i r ms  Pe rc e nt  
2 or less 98,671  57.9  8 9 , 9 2 7 5 3 . 9
3 to 5  3 8 , 1 2 9 22.4  4 0 , 3 0 4 2 4 . 2
6 to 10  1 8 , 1 3 5 10.6  1 9 , 3 9 3 1 1 . 6
11 to 20  8 , 7 2 7 5.1  9,402  5 . 6
21 or mo re  6,813  4.0  7,714  4 . 6
Total  170,475  100.0  166,740  100.0  
Notes: (1) B u s i ness starts consist of newly opened active establishme nt s. It does no t
i nc l ude changes in ownership of pre v iously opera t i ng busine s s e s, me rge r s
or changes in the business na me, location or legal type.
S o u rces: (1 ) Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t ion, ‘1996-1997 Business Starts Record ’.
G i ven the size distribution of new start-ups revealed in the Dun &
B ra d s t reet data, it might be expected that most of these new busi-
nesses would be sole pro p r i e t o rships or partners h i p s. Howeve r, as
s h own in table 3.2, this was not the case. In fact, the majority of new
business start-ups in 1997 we re incorporated. This is shown in table
3.2 (below ) .
Table 3.2 B u s i ness starts by type of enterprise in the USA in 1997
Type of ent e r p r i s e No. of new business starts
Un k nown  2
P ro p r ietorship  6 1 , 0 4 5
Pa r t nership  1 4 , 9 4 9
C o r p o ra t ion  9 0 , 7 4 4
Total  1 6 6 , 7 4 0
Notes: (1) B u s i ness starts consist of newly opened active establishme nt s. It does no t
i nc l ude changes in ownership of pre v iously opera t i ng busine s s e s, me rge r s
or changes in the business na me, location or legal type.
S o u rces: (1) Data pro v ided to Mic ro no m ic s, Inc. by Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t io n .
Available data confirms that almost 80% of new business start-ups
in the United States in 1997 we re in the service sector. Re l a t i vely few
we re started in either the primary or secondary sector. This is show n
in table 3.3 (ove r l e a f ) .
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No. of ne w S h a re of total no. 
I ndustry Sector b u s i ness starts of new business starts (%)
Ag r ic u l t u re, fo restry & fishing  2,275  1 . 4
M i n i ng  655  0 . 4
C o ns t r uc t ion  18,513  1 1 . 1
Ma nu fa c t u r i ng  13,144  7 . 9
Tra ns p o r t a t ion & public utilities  8,741  5 . 2
W holesale tra de  15,780  9 . 5
Retail tra de  36,377  2 1 . 8
F i na nc e, ins u ra nce & real estate  12,198  7 . 3
S e r v ices  50,253  3 0 . 1
Unc l a s s i f iable establishme nts  8,804  5 . 3
Total  166,740  1 0 0 . 0
Notes: (1) B u s i ness starts consist of newly opened active establishme nt s. It does no t
i nc l ude changes in ownership of pre v iously opera t i ng busine s s e s, me rge r s
or changes in the business na me, location or legal status of ent e r p r i s e s
S o u rces: (1) Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t ion, ‘1996-1997 Business Starts Record ’.
3 . 2 . 2 Business failure
Recent tre n d s
As shown in table 3.4 (overleaf), the total number of business fail-
u res in the United States rose considerably over the period 1984-
1992. In the following three ye a rs, business failures fell somew h a t .
P rovisional figures show a significant increase in 1997. This incre a s e
is most likely a delayed effect of the increase in new firm formation
o b s e r ved in the early to mid-1990s. The link between new firm for-
mation and business failure (a high proportion of new businesses fail
for reasons unconnected to the business cycle) is a complicating fac-
tor in the otherwise pro - cyclical relationship between the state of the
US economy and the number of business failure s. The decline ob-
s e r ved in ave rage liability per business failure that occurred from the
early to mid-1990s  onwa rds is a likely result of  strong economic
g rowth in the US.
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In 1997, approximately 60% of all business bankruptcy filings (inclu-
ding sole pro p r i e t o rs and partnerships), we re made under Chapter 7.
Detailed figures are shown in table 3.5 (overleaf). To some ex t e n t ,
h oweve r, this figure could be argued to understate the re l a t i ve impor-
tance of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings, since many Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 filings ultimately become Chapter 7 cases. Unfortunately,
it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the distribution of
b a n k r u p t cy filings between different types of enterprise because of
the large number of entries in the unknown category.
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Table 3.4 Number of business fa i l u res in the USA, 1984-1997
Number of Av e ra ge liability  Number of fa i l u res per 10,000 Total number of firms 
fa i l u re s per fa i l u re ($) f i r ms with employees with employees
1985  57,253  645,160  112  5 , 1 2 7 , 0 0 0
1986  61,616  725,850  118  5 , 2 1 3 , 0 0 0
1987  61,111  568,209  113  5 , 3 9 3 , 0 0 0
1988  57,097  693,084  104  5 , 5 1 0 , 0 0 0
1989  50,361  840,507  90  5 , 5 7 0 , 0 0 0
1990  60,747  923,996  108  5 , 6 4 1 , 0 0 0
1991  88,140  1,098,539  155  5 , 6 8 5 , 0 0 0
1992  97,069  971,653  169  5 , 7 4 1 , 0 0 0
1993  86,133  554,438  147  5 , 8 5 1 , 0 0 0
1994  71,558  404,956  119  5 , 9 9 2 , 0 0 0
1995  71,128  524,175  117  6 , 0 6 8 , 0 0 0
1996  71,931  411,071  111  6 , 4 6 3 , 0 0 0
1997  83,384  448,970  n/a  n / a
No t e s : ( 1 ) F ig u res for 1997 are pre l i m i nary only.
( 2 ) B u s i ness fa i l u res inc l ude businesses that ceased opera t io ns fo l l o w i ng assig n me nt  or bankruptcy,
ceased opera t io ns with losses to creditors after such actio ns as fo re c l o s u re or attachme nt, volunt a r i-
ly withdrew leaving unpaid de b t s, were involved in court actio ns such as receivership, re o rg a n i s a t io n
or arra nge me nt, or voluntarily compromised with cre d i t o r s.
( 3 ) Total conc e r ns re p re s e nt the total number of business enterprises inc l uded in the Dun & Bra d s t re e t
U.S. da t a b a s e.
S o u rc e s : ( 1 ) Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t ion, ‘1997 Business Failure Record’ and number of enterprises is orig i na t i ng
f rom the Small Business Adm i n i s t ra t ion (SBA ) .Ave rage Age of Business Fa i l u re
In general, a greater percentage of businesses fail within the first five
ye a rs of their lifetimes than businesses that survive for six to ten
ye a rs. This is shown in the figures cited in table 3.6 (below). The
available evidence does not suggest that significant differences ex i s t
in this respect between different types of business (table 3.7, ove r-
l e a f ) .
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Table 3.5 B u s i ness fa i l u res by type of enterprise and chapter in the USA in 1997
Un k no w n Chapter 7 Chapter 9 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 To t a l
Un k no w n 9 1 7 3 7 , 5 2 4 1 2 2 , 4 1 7 4 2 5 1 1 , 9 8 8 5 3 , 2 8 3
P ro p r ie t o r s h i p 8 4 4 7 , 7 4 1 2 4 4 0 5 4 3 , 0 6 2 1 2 , 1 4 3
Pa r t ne r s h i p 2 8 3 7 1 6 1 2 6 4 1 8 2 3 9 1 , 5 2 1
C o r p o ra t io n 6 , 4 2 3 5 , 1 0 6 7 4 , 5 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 1 6 , 4 3 7
To t a l 8 , 4 6 7 5 1 , 0 8 7 2 2 7 , 6 6 5 5 2 1 1 5 , 6 2 2 8 3 , 3 8 4
No t e s : ( 1 )Data are pre l i m i nary only.
Chapter 12 deals with the adjustme nt of debts of family fa r mers with regular annual inc o me.
( 3 )B u s i ness fa i l u res inc l ude businesses that ceased opera t io ns fo l l o w i ng assig n me nt or bankruptcy, ceased
o p e ra t io ns with losses to creditors after such actio ns as fo re c l o s u re or attachme nt, voluntarily with-
drew leaving unpaid de b t s, were involved in court actio ns such as receivership, re o rg a n i s a t ion or
a r ra nge me nt, or voluntarily compromised with cre d i t o r s.
( 4 )T he large number of ent r ies in the ‘unknown’ category reflects ina de q ua c ies in data reported in bank-
ruptcy filing s. A comparison of pre v ious pre l i m i nary and revised data for earlier years ind icates that the
p re l i m i nary na t u re of the fig u res pre s e nted in table 3.5 is not the cause.
S o u rc e s : ( 1 )Data pro v ided to Mic ro no m ic s, Inc. by Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t io n .2 9
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USA in 1997
Ye a r s
Un k nown  6 . 5 3
P ro p r ietorship  9 . 6 2
Pa r t nership  9 . 4 2
C o r p o ra t ion  1 0 . 7 6
No t e s : ( 1 )B u s i ness  fa i l u res  inc l ude  businesses  that  ceased  opera t io ns  fo l l o w i ng
a s s ig n me nt or bankruptcy, ceased opera t io ns with losses to creditors after
s uch actio ns as fo re c l o s u re or attachme nt, voluntarily withdrew leaving
u n p a id de b t s, were involved in court actio ns such as receivership, re o rg a-
n i s a t ion or arra nge me nt, or voluntarily compromised with cre d i t o r s.
S o u rc e s : ( 1 )Data pro v ided to Mic ro no m ic s, Inc. by Dun & Bra d s t reet Corpora t io n .
Chapter 11 cases
Ac c o rding to popular belief, Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases are domi-
nated numerically by larg e, publicly owned companies. In fact, the
opposite is the case. Ac c o rding to a study published by the American
B a n k r u p t cy Institute, for instance, approximately 85% of all Chapter
11 cases are accounted for by enterprises with under $ 10 million in
assets and liabilities.
1 O ve rall, 65% of all enterprises in the study had
b e t ween $ 500,000 and $ 10 million in assets and liabilities. Another
20% had assets and liabilities in the $ 100,000 to $ 500,000 ra n g e. In
numerical terms, SMEs dominate Chapter 11 filings.
Another popular  perception  is  that  Chapter 11 debtors  remain in
b a n k r u p t cy for seve ral ye a rs. Ac c o rding to a recent litera t u re survey,
t h e re is some element of truth in this belief.
2 Studies cove red by the
rev i ew variously reported the ave rage time larg e, publicly held deb-
tor companies remain under Chapter 11 protection as ranging fro m
16.2 to 32 months. The re l a t i vely wide range of figures obtained in
these studies was due to differences in sample size and possible
selection bias. In general, the larger the sample size, the lower the
ave rage  time  the  debtors  spent  under  re o rganisation.  What  data
exists does not necessarily confirm the view that smaller companies
spend substantially less time in re o rg a n i s a t i o n .
3
3 . 2 . 3 Firm Surviva l
A fundamental tenet of business economics is that start-ups are more
v u l n e rable than more mature companies. Similarly, it is often re-
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1 F e n n i ng, Lisa Hill, ‘Me a s u r i ng Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases,’ American Bankruptcy
I n s t i t u t e .
2 L o P ucki, Lynn M., ‘The Trouble with Chapter 11,’ Wisconsin Law Review, 1993.
3 L o P ucki, Lynn M. Supra note 3.ported that smaller companies are more likely to fail than larger ones.
The data for the United States are in accordance with these views
(see tables 3.8 and 3.9).
Table 3.8 B u s i ness survival rates by age cohort in the USA
Age cohort (years)  1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6
0 - 2 0 . 7 6 9 0 . 5 6 2 0 . 4 9 3 0 . 4 0 4 0 . 3 4 4
3 - 4 0 . 7 1 9 0 . 5 2 1 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 3 9 9 0 . 3 4 7
5 - 9 0 . 7 1 6 0 . 5 6 7 0 . 5 2 2 0 . 4 5 3 0 . 4 0 2
1 0 - 1 9 0 . 7 3 9 0 . 6 2 4 0 . 5 8 5 0 . 5 2 0 0 . 4 6 9
2 0 + 0 . 7 4 1 0 . 6 3 9 0 . 6 0 1 0 . 5 3 9 0 . 4 8 8
No t e s : ( 1 ) This table shows the pro p o r t ion of firms that were within a given age class
in 1976 that survived through 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984 and 1986.
S o u rc e s : ( 1 ) B u s i ness Survival Rates by Age Cohort of Busine s s, pre p a red for the Offic e
of  Ad v o c a c y,  U.S.  Small  Business  Adm i n i s t ra t ion  by  Joel  Popkin  and
C o m p a ny, April 1991.
Table 3.9 B u s i ness survival rates by firm employme nt size cohort in the USA
E m p l o y me nt size class  1978  1980  1982  1984  1 9 8 6
1 - 4 0 . 6 6 2 0 . 4 7 5 0 . 4 3 3 0 . 3 5 8 0 . 3 0 9
5 - 9 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 6 9 2 0 . 6 3 9 0 . 5 7 0 0 . 5 1 2
1 0 - 1 9 0 . 8 5 8 0 . 7 6 3 0 . 7 0 7 0 . 6 4 4 0 . 5 8 6
2 0 - 4 9 0 . 8 8 0 0 . 7 9 4 0 . 7 3 2 0 . 6 7 0 0 . 6 1 0
5 0 + 0 . 8 9 2 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 7 4 9 0 . 6 8 9 0 . 6 2 8
No t e s : ( 1 ) This table shows the pro p o r t ion of firms that were within a given employ-
me nt size class in 1976 that survived through 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984 and
1 9 8 6 .
S o u rc e s : ( 1 ) B u s i ness Survival Rates by Age Cohort of Busine s s, pre p a red for the Offic e
of  Ad v o c a c y,  U.S.  Small  Business  Adm i n i s t ra t ion  by  Joel  Popkin  and
C o m p a ny, April 1991. 
No studies exist at present in the United States which compare the
s u r v i val rates of businesses owned or managed by individuals with
no prior experience of business failure, to those owned or managed
by individuals that have prior experience of business failure. The lite-
ra t u re has, howeve r, ex p l o red certain other issues. One recent study,
for instance, examined survival rates among franchise and non-fra n-
chise small firms started between 1984 and 1987.
1 In tracking sur-
v i val rates through  late  1991,  the author  found  that  the  surviva l
p rospects of independent business start-ups are better than those of
f ra n c h i s e s. A separate study concludes that new business surviva l
rates are as high in rural areas as they are in urban are a s.
2
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1 B a t e s, T. ‘A Comparison of Fra nchise and Inde p e nde nt Small Business Survival Rates,’ S m a l l
Business Economics, 1995.
2 B u s s, T. F. and X. Lin, ‘Business Survival in Rural Ame r ica: A Three-State Study, Growth and
C h a n g e, 1990.3 . 3 Obstacles to Po s t - Fa i l u re
E n t re p reneurial Ac t i v i t y
I n t ro d u c t i o n
In this section an assessment is provided of the main obstacles faced
by persons seeking to start a new ve n t u re after previous ex p e r i e n c e
of business failure. In this context, a notewo r t hy degree of consensus
was evident amongst the survey ’s re s p o n d e n t s. This was true re g a rd-
less of the different opinions held by re s p o n d e n t s, for instance, about
the likely impact of proposed legislative re f o r m s. With the exc e p t i o n
of the ove rall summary, each subsection presented relates to a single
potential obstacle.
3 . 3 . 1 Relief from debts
As intended, United States bankruptcy law is generally successful in
p roviding  effective  relief  for  individuals  and  businesses  from  the
claims of cre d i t o rs.
1 This is re i n f o rced by the fact that an individual
cannot be sued in respect of contract debt after certain state-specific
time limits have ex p i red, often six ye a rs (ten ye a rs for debt related to
real estate). Legally, there f o re, persons are able to make a fresh start
after bankruptcy. The same is essentially true for businesses that
h ave had a Chapter 11 case confirmed.
The above notwithstanding, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is
e m p owe red to pursue individuals without time limit in respect of
a r re a rs on pay roll taxes and social security obligations. In addition,
the IRS can pursue the key officers of a business entity for arre a rs,
even if the business entity no longer ex i s t s. The IRS does, howeve r,
m a ke efforts to arrive at reasonable settlements with individuals, pro-
viding there is no evidence of fra u d .
One further qualification to be made is that the financial affairs of
parties (not least sole pro p r i e t o rships and the self-employed) filing
for bankruptcy are often in complete disarray. Indeed, pro f e s s i o n a l s
d i rectly invo l ved in bankruptcy proceedings often observe that an
alarmingly high proportion of SMEs filing for bankruptcy do not have
even rudimentary accounting or management information systems in
p l a c e. Providing relief from debts does not solve this pro b l e m .
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1 This is true with the proviso, of course, that legal business ent i t ies are liquidated and dis-
solved in Chapter 7 bankruptcie s.3 . 3 . 2 C redit history
In the United States, a number of organisations collect and prov i d e
detailed information on the credit histories of individuals and busines-
s e s. For businesses, the principal provider is Dun & Bra d s t re e t .
1 Fo r
i n d i v i d u a l s, the main credit reporting agency is TRW.
2 Both services
a re  used  by  banks,  credit  card  companies  and  other  prov i d e rs  of
finance to judge the cre d i t worthiness of applicants. Suppliers use these
services to judge the cre d i t worthiness of their customers or clients.
In its credit rating re p o r t s, Dun & Bra d s t reet identifies major share-
h o l d e rs or ow n e rs of each enterprise (unless a publicly owned com-
p a ny is invo l ved), the names of its dire c t o rs and principal exe c u t i ve
o f f i c e rs, and other companies these individuals have been associated
with in a similar capacity. It also details court actions filed against
either  the  business  in  question  or  individuals  named  within  its
re p o r t s. Given this, and the fact that Dun & Bra d s t reet is also able to
p rovide  personal  credit  reports  on  request  (through  Equifax,  an
individual credit reporting agency), an extended credit history can be
built-up  on a business, its  major share h o l d e rs or  ow n e rs (exc e p t
publicly  owned  companies), dire c t o rs, principal  exe c u t i ve  officers
and any other business entities it is linked to through either ow n e r-
ship or management.
U n l i ke Dun & Bra d s t reet, TRW does not provide credit ratings as
such. Ra t h e r, it provides extended information on the credit and pay-
ment history of individuals which subscribers use to make their eva l-
uations  of  cre d i t wo r t h i n e s s.  TRW  obtains  its  information  fro m
b a n k s, credit card companies, public utilities, department stores and
court re c o rd s.
In  principle,  someone  who  is  revealed  by  either  TRW  or  Dun  &
B ra d s t reet to have a poor credit history, or a past association with busi-
ness failure, may find access to credit restricted or more ex p e n s i ve.
S i m i l a r l y, such a person may find himself or herself offered wo rs e
terms by suppliers. These potential barriers to post business-failure
start-ups are considered in more detail in the following sections.
3 . 3 . 3 Access to loan and ove rd raft finance
Individuals who have a past association with business failure typi-
cally find themselves excluded from the prime or first-tier market for
bank finance or credit. This is true largely re g a rdless of the type of
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1 This inc l udes sole pro p r ie t o r s h i p s.
2 T he credit re p o r t i ng division of TRW has re c e ntly been sold and now operates under the na me
E x p e r ia n .business that failed, since banks typically carry out compre h e n s i ve
c redit checks that extend to personal histories using both their ow n
re s o u rces and the services of outside companies. Precisely how long
access is denied is likely to depend on the bank or credit prov i d e r
concerned, the reason why an individual’s business failed and the
n a t u re of the new business that finance is sought for. If there we re
good reasons for a business failure (e.g., partner fraud, divo rce), the
individual concerned subsequently has a good track re c o rd, earns a
regular income, approaches a bank or credit provider with a solid
business plan and is able to provide collateral (unlikely in all but a
f ew cases), then he or she may regain access to the prime lending
m a r ket after just 4-5 ye a rs. In certain circ u m s t a n c e s, some lenders
might even judge past experience of business failure to be a positive
f a c t o r. This notwithstanding,  more  conserva t i ve  banks  reject  any
application for a bank loan or ove rd raft finance if there is any pre-
vious association with business failure. It should be noted, howeve r,
that United States legislation re q u i res that credit reporting agencies
(Dun & Bra d s t reet, TRW) re m ove from their databases all informa-
tion pertaining to bankruptcy filings after ten ye a rs at most. The
same is true re g a rding instances of payment delinquency.
Whilst persons who have a previous association with business fail-
u re are likely to face restricted access to the prime lending market in
the United States, they are still likely to find it re l a t i vely easy to ra i s e
finance in the sub-prime or second tier marke t .
1 Indeed, it is now
common for individuals to finance new business ve n t u res using cre-
dit card finance. This is particularly the case vis-à-vis sole pro p r i e t o rs
and the self-employed. Finance can also be readily obtained by re -
mortgaging home equity (subject to state-specific upper limits, home
equity is exempt from cre d i t o rs’ claims in bankruptcy pro c e e d i n g s ) .
At most, it may take an individual two ye a rs before he or she is able
to obtain loan finance or credit in the sub-prime marke t .
G i ven the above, restricted access to loan finance does not re p re s e n t
as seve re a barrier to post-failure entre p reneurial activity as it might
appear to. Howeve r, sub-prime interest rates often reach as high as
25% annual percentage rate (APR), compared to perhaps 7.5-10 . 5 %
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1 No standa rd de f i n i t ion of what constitutes the sub-prime ma r ket ex i s t s. In ge ne ral, it re f e r s
to the segme nt of the lend i ng ma r ket that is conc e r ned with ma k i ng loans or credit avail-
able to ind i v iduals or businesses that have poor credit ra t i ng s. In the past, sub-prime lend i ng
was do m i nated by a few fina nce companies (not least ones owned by automobile ma nu fa c-
t u rers). To da y, credit card companie s, credit unio ns and even banks have ent e red the ma r-
ket. A brief overview of the ma r ket is pro v ided by the Senate Banking, Ho u s i ng and Urban
A f fairs Subcommittee on Fina nc ial Ins t i t u t io ns and Regulatory Relief, ‘Oversig ht He a r i ng on
t he Cond i t ion of the Banking and Thrift Indu s t r ies and the Cond i t ion of the Bank Ins u ra nc e
F u nd and Savings As s o c ia t ion Ins u ra nce Fund.’ Pre p a red Te s t i mo ny of the Ho no rable Andre w
Ho v e, Ac t i ng Chairman, Fede ral Deposit Ins u ra nce Corpora t ion, September 24, 1997.APR in the prime marke t .
1 Re-mortgaging home equity in the sub-
prime  market  will  also  typically  invo l ve  high  arrangement  fees,
sometimes in excess of $ 5,000 on re l a t i vely small loans. The impli-
cation of this is that persons who have a re l a t i vely recent association
with business failure can face a significantly higher cost of capital
than do entre p re n e u rs who have  no such  association.  This  com-
pounds the obvious difficulty faced by those concerned, i.e., that
t h ey do not have spare re s o u rces to invest or assets loans cannot
readily be secured, if at all. At least in the short run, there f o re, a bar-
rier to entry ex i s t s, particularly in more capital intensive industries.
The reve rse is true in sectors which do not re q u i re a lot of capital,
e.g., certain service sectors. It should, of cours e, also be noted that
sophisticated businesses are sometimes able to minimize the amount
of external  finance  they need to attract by delaying payments to
s u p p l i e rs,  obtaining  payment  for  services  or  goods  supplied  in
a d vance and so on. Fu r t h e r m o re, it should be emphasised that a poor
c redit history leads in itself to restricted access to the prime lending
m a r ket. The fact that a person or business has actually filed for bank-
r u p t cy is thus not the sole determining factor.
3 . 3 . 4 Access to ve n t u re capital
As part of the due diligence pro c e s s, ve n t u re capital companies per-
form ex t e n s i ve credit checks on individuals who approach them in
an effort to raise capital. Such checks are typically performed using
a combination of internal re s o u rces and external services such as
T RW and Dun & Bra d s t reet. If an applicant is re l a t i vely young (as
might be the case in high technology fields), then credit checks are
l i kely to be less ex t e n s i ve. Credit checks play a part in judging the
merits  of  applications  for  ve n t u re  capital  finance,  but  numero u s
other factors are also considered. These factors include the specifics
of the business plan submitted, ow n e rship of intellectual pro p e r t y,
results of a competitor analys i s, possession of agreements of prin-
ciple to purchase from pro s p e c t i ve customers and so on. Past asso-
ciation with business failure does not, there f o re, necessarily preve n t
someone from obtaining ve n t u re capital. It is also not likely to lead
to an applicant being offered wo rse terms or conditions than wo u l d
otherwise be the case. Indeed, previous experience of business fail-
u re may even be seen as a positive factor. This depends on the re a-
sons why a business failed, what lessons we re learnt and the nature
of the experiences gained. Experience of business failure is more like-
ly to be seen positively in pro g re s s i ve, liberal areas where there is a
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1 T he annual perc e nt a ge rate (APR) payable on a loan or debt corre s p o nds to the compounde d
yearly equivalent of the mo nthly ra t e. A mo nthly int e rest rate of 1%, for ins t a nc e, is equiva-
l e nt to an APR of 12.68%.p re p o n d e rance  of  high-technology  start-ups than  in  isolated  rura l
communities or areas dominated by traditional industries. Silicon
Va l l ey is often cited as a region in which failure is re g a rded as an
important opportunity for learning.
1 One reason for this is that many
of the founders of what have become the largest and most successful
Silicon Va l l ey companies failed in previous enterprises. Cultural fac-
t o rs which emphasize entre p re n e u rship and risk taking are also cru-
c i a l .
2 In short, a previous association with business failure does not
necessarily adve rsely affect access to ve n t u re capital. New business
ve n t u res are typically judged on their own merits. This notwithstan-
ding, it should be noted that many (if not most) sole pro p r i e t o rs and
s e l f - e m p l oyed individuals are not engaged in lines of business where
access to ve n t u re capital is an issue.
3 . 3 . 5 C o n t ra c t o rs bonds and license re q u i rements 
In many states, a contractor is re q u i red by law to obtain a contra c-
t o rs’ bond  or pay a deposit to  a  regulatory  body responsible  for
issuing  contra c t o rs’  licenses.  Contra c t o rs’  bonds  are  arra n g e d
t h rough private companies in a manner akin to obtaining insura n c e.
The bonds  are  intended  to  cover  claims  for  faulty  or unfinished
work, damage to property and so on. Contra c t o rs pay an amount
each month in respect of the bonds they are re q u i red to obtain. The
amounts paid depend on the sector wo r ked in and the credit ra t i n g
of  the  contractor  concerned.  Self-employed  contra c t o rs  or  ones
owned by individuals who have a past history of business failure or
b a n k r u p t cy (public companies excepted) may have some difficulty in
obtaining a contra c t o rs’ bond on good terms, or be re q u i red to make
very high monthly pay m e n t s.
In California the regulatory body in question is the Contra c t o rs’ State
License  Board.  It  re q u i res  that  a  contra c t o rs’  bond or  deposit  of 
$ 7,500 be paid prior to the issuance of a license. Applicants for a
c o n t ra c t o rs’  license in  California  must  also prove  that  they  have
o p e rating capital exceeding $ 2,500. These re q u i rements exa c e r b a t e
p roblems  former  debtors  may  have  with  restricted  access  to the
prime  lending  market.  Sectors  such  as  electrical  contra c t i n g ,
construction and painting are most likely to be affected by this factor.
3 . 3 . 6 S u p p l i e rs
In principle, suppliers of a business are able to check the credit his-
tory of its officers or major share h o l d e rs, or companies they have pre-
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1 S a xe n ian, A. Regional advantage. 1994. Ha r v a rd University Press: Cambridge, Ma s s a c hu s e t t s
a nd London, United Kingdo m .
2 I nt e re s t i ng  discussio ns  of  this  topic  are  cont a i ned  in  a  number  of  articles  in  F o r b e s
Supplement On The Information Age, June 2, 1997.viously been associated with in a similar capacity. This was ex p l a i n-
ed in the section above. For SMEs in particular, howeve r, the use of
such services is re l a t i vely ex p e n s i ve. This is especially true if one
seeks to trace the credit history of other companies a person has been
an officer or major shareholder of, since it would re q u i re that cre d i t
reports be obtained for multiple companies. Many SMEs there f o re do
not obtain credit reports on their customers. Given this and the na-
t u re of competition in most marke t s, entre p re n e u rs who have pre-
viously  been  associated  with  business  failure  are  unlikely  to  be
o f f e red wo rse terms by suppliers than ones who have not. No sig-
nificant barrier there f o re ex i s t s. The only exception to this might be
in isolated, smaller communities where there are very few suppliers
within a particular line of business.
3 . 3 . 7 O ve rall assessment
Pe rsons who have experienced business failure in the United States
do not face seve re obstacles when attempting subsequently to start a
n ew business. Perhaps the only significant barrier faced is that of re-
stricted access to the first-tier market for loan capital and  cre d i t .
External finance can be obtained readily in the sub-prime marke t ,
but at very high interest rates and on wo rse terms than for pre f e r re d
c u s t o m e rs. Those affected may thus face a higher cost of capital.
Although conditions have changed considerably in recent decades, a
d e g ree of stigma is still attached to business failure and bankruptcy
in parts of the United States. This is most likely to be a problem in
small, isolated communities, not in large urban are a s.
Whilst the above points might generally be true, a number of quali-
fications should be made. First, a number of first-tier banks may still
p rovide loan finance, even if an applicant does have a past associa-
tion with business failure. This would depend on the reason why the
p revious ve n t u re failed, subsequent credit history, the specifics of the
business plan submitted and the amount of collateral ava i l a b l e. In
certain circ u m s t a n c e s, some lenders might even judge past ex p e r i-
ence of business failure to be a positive factor. Either way, access to
the prime lending market is likely to be re s t o red after 4-5 ye a rs if a
n ew ve n t u re proves successful. Second, an association with prev i o u s
business failure does not necessarily restrict access to ve n t u re capi-
tal. Credit checks are performed, but numerous other factors are also
c o n s i d e red and each case is judged on its own merits. Previous ex p e-
rience of business failure might even be seen as a positive factor.
T h i rd, to the extent that external finance is more ex p e n s i ve, this fac-
tor will be less important in sectors where significant start-up capital
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nificant proportion of individuals who experience business failure do
start new ve n t u res in subsequent ye a rs. This point is ex p l o red in
g reater depth in the next section.
In short, individuals in the United States who have declared bank-
r u p t cy, or who have been associated with business failure in the
past,  do  not  face insurmountable  obstacles  when  starting  again.
Indeed, the available evidence suggests that there are few barriers of
a ny  great significance. There is also some truth to the  view that
h aving experience of business failure is seen within certain circles as
a positive factor. More specifically, prov i d e rs of external finance may
re g a rd such experience favo u rably if it has provided valuable lessons
about what mistakes to avoid and how better to solve pro b l e m s. This
is less likely to be true in small, isolated communities or tra d i t i o n a l
industries where a degree of stigma is still attached.
3 . 4 Po s t - Fa i l u re Start-Ups and Support
M e a s u re s
I n t ro d u c t i o n
In the previous section of this report, it was concluded that, in gener-
al, persons who have experienced business failure do not face seve re
obstacles or barriers when subsequently attempting to start a new
ve n t u re. The first part of this section presents the evidence there is to
confirm that this is true and that a significant proportion of pers o n s
who have failed previously in a business ve n t u re in the United States
a re able to try again. The second part of this section describes a num-
ber of support measures re l evant to the efforts of such individuals.
3 . 4 . 1 Evidence of post-failure start-ups
Published survey data
Very little has been published in the United States about the pro p o r-
tion of individuals who experience business failure only to start new
ve n t u re s. One reason for this is seems to be that people do appear to
be able to start again in business after failure, and often do just that.
The issue is thus not contentious. This notwithstanding, two studies
a re worth noting.
The first study was actually a pilot-study conducted for the Small
Business  Ad m i n i s t ration  in  1993/94.
1 U n f o r t u n a t e l y,  a  full-scale
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1 M&R  As s o c ia t e s.  Function  of  failure.  Small  Business  Adm i n i s t ra t ion  Office  of  Ad v o c a c y,
C o nt ract No. SBA- 6 6 4 4 - OA-91. June 1994. M&R As s o c iates: Rockville, MD.study has never been undertaken, but the results of the pilot are inte-
resting nonetheless. The study succeeded in contacting and intervie-
wing the ow n e rs of 101 small businesses that had filed for Chapter 7
b a n k r u p t cy over the period 1989-93. Amongst the survey ’s main fin-
ding we re that 47% of all respondents had resumed their care e rs in
business after having filed for bankruptcy (this compares to 41 %
who took up paid employment). A lower percentage was re c o rded in
the trade sector which tends to re q u i re long hours and significant
capital tied up in inve n t o r y. The reve rse was true for the service sec-
t o r. Ty p i c a l l y, only 2-3 ye a rs would pass before individuals we re able
to fully adjust to the negative aspects of the bankruptcy ex p e r i e n c e
and start a new business. New businesses we re smaller, but it is not
clear whether this was because of lessons that had been learned and
attempts  to  be  more  efficient  or  because  of a  more  conserva t i ve
a p p roach to hiring in the start-up phase. The survey also identified a
c o re group of serial entre p re n e u rs who had owned seve ral busines-
ses during their care e rs, both before and after the noted Chapter 7
f i l i n g .
1
A second study wo r t hy of note is one funded by the Educational
E n d owment of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. The
results of the study are due to be published in mid-October 1998 at
the annual  convention of the National Conference of  Bankruptcy
J u d g e s. One of its main aims was to track outcomes in Chapter 7 and
13 business bankruptcy filings. An earlier paper sets out the study’s
aims and methodology in full.
2
The experience of re s p o n d e n t s
In general, the views of those individuals contacted as part of this
study agreed with the conclusions drawn by the studies described in
the previous subsection. In short, respondents confirmed that anec-
dotal stories are not myth. It is common for people to start again after
h aving a business fail. One respondent who deals with literally thou-
sands of small business Chapter 7 bankruptcies a year stated that the
vast majority of his previously self-employed clients start again with-
in one ye a r, even if on a very small-scale basis. Another re s p o n d e n t
stated that approximately 90% of all persons filing for chapter 7
small business bankruptcies start new ve n t u res within five ye a rs.
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1 Un fo r t u na t e l y, no statistical data was pro v ided on the size of this group or in support of ma ny
of the conc l u s io ns pre s e nted in the pilot-study report. The survey questio n na i re also did no t
ask any questio ns about the obstacles faced by ind i v iduals in attempting to start again. A
c o m p a n ion do c u me nt and full dataset of the results is available from M&R As s o c iates for $
2 1 , 0 0 0 .
2 Wa r ren, E. and J. L. We s t b rook. ‘Searc h i ng for re o rg a n i z a t ion re a l i t ie s.’ Washington University
Law Quarterly. Fall 1994.Often, such a person would not start out in business immediately.
Paid employment would initially be taken to stabilise the financial
situation confronting the person in question and to provide time to
re-establish  access  to  credit  on  acceptable  terms.  This  course  of
action would also allow the person invo l ved to gain experience and
perhaps build up a client base.
3 . 4 . 2 Support measure s
S BA loan guarantee pro g ra m s
The U.S. Small Business Ad m i n i s t ration (SBA) 7(a) Loan Guara n t y
P ro g ram is one of the SBA’s primary lending pro g ra m s, prov i d i n g
loans to small businesses unable to secure financing through normal
lending  channels.  As  such,  the  pro g ram  can  assist  individuals
attempting  to  start  businesses  after  a  previous  history  of failure.
P r i vate sector lenders provide loans that are guaranteed by the SBA
since the agency has  no funds  for direct lending. The maximum
amount the SBA can guarantee is $ 750,000. With a lender re q u e s-
ting the maximum SBA guarantee of 75%, the total loan amount
available under this pro g ram is limited to $ 1 million.
Cash flow and the ability to re p ay loans are primary considera t i o n s
of the SBA in evaluating applications. Good chara c t e r, management
c a p a b i l i t y, collateral, and ow n e r ’s equity contribution are also impor-
tant. In addition, ow n e rs of 20% or more are re q u i red to guara n t e e
p e rsonally SBA loans. Prior association with business failure will not
necessarily prevent an applicant from securing a loan guara n t e e.
Under the terms of the pro g ram interest ra t e s, which may be fixed or
va r i a b l e, are negotiated between the borrower and the lender but are
subject to SBA maximums that are pegged to the Prime Ra t e. Fixe d
rate loans must not exceed Prime Plus 2.25% if the maturity is less
than 7 ye a rs, and Prime Plus 2.75% if the maturity is 7 ye a rs or more.
For loans of less than $ 25,000, the maximum interest rate must not
exceed Prime Plus 4.25% and 4.75% re s p e c t i vely; for loans betwe e n
$ 25,000 and $ 50,000, maximum rates must not exceed 3.25% and
3.75% re s p e c t i ve l y. Variable rate loans may be pegged to either the
l owest prime rate of the SBA optional peg ra t e. This rate is a we i g h t-
ed ave rage of rates the government pays for loans with maturities
similar to the ave rage SBA loan. The lender and the borrower nego-
tiate the amount of the spread that will be added to the base ra t e. An
adjustment period is selected which will identify the fre q u e n cy at
which the note rate will change. This period must be no more often
than monthly and must be consistent. 
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a p p roved. These fees can be passed on to the borrower once they
h ave been paid by the lender and are determined by the amount of
the loan guara n t y. When the guaranty portion of the loan is $ 80,000
or less, a 2% guaranty fee will be charged; 3% for loans more than
$  80,000 but less  than $  250,000;  3.5%  for  the  next  $  250 , 0 0 0 ;
3.875% for any portion greater than $ 500,000. In addition, all loans
will be subject to a fifty basis point (0.5%) annualized servicing fee
which is applied to the outstanding balance of SBA’s guaranteed por-
tion of the loan.
Educational and cre d i t - rehabilitation pro g ra m s
One of the conclusions arrived at by the National Bankruptcy Rev i ew
Commission, amongst others, is that a definite need exists for many
individuals and small businesses that file for bankruptcy to be more
informed about managing their finances, the true cost of finance
(particularly in the sub-prime market) and so on. In the case of small
businesses filing for bankruptcy protection, a disturbingly high num-
ber lack even rudimentary management information or accounting
sys t e m s. Ac c o rd i n g l y, United States Bankruptcy Trustees in certain
parts of the country have initiated educational and credit re h a b i l i t a-
tion pro g ra m s. One such pro g ram is found in Nashville, Te n n e s s e e
and is aimed at helping individuals and small businesses that file for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. More specifically, the pro g ram aims to assist
participants in avoiding financial problems in the future and to re d u-
ce the number of Chapter 13 cases that end up being converted to
Chapter 7 cases because the individuals or small businesses con-
cerned fail to complete a re p ayment and re o rganisation plan.
The  Tennessee  pro g ram  was  started  by  a  local  United  States
B a n k r u p t cy  Trustee  approximately  20  ye a rs  ago.  The  Trustee  in
question  presently  ove rsees  about  3,000  Chapter  13  bankruptcy
cases a ye a r. The pro g ram has three elements.
The first element of the pro g ram is the holding of a series of debt
counselling classes aimed at improving the understanding of partici-
pants about why they got into difficulties, how to better manage their
finances and so on.
1 These classes are attended at different times
during the completion of the Chapter 13 re o rganisation plans. The
f i rst class is mandatory.
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1 In conjunc t ion with the Na t io nal As s o c ia t ion of Chapter 13 Tr u s t e e s, the Na t io nal Founda t io n
for Cons u mer Credit and its member Couns e l l i ng Service Age nc ie s, VISA USA has pro duc e d
workbooks which are also aimed at he l p i ng Chapter 13 debtors to improve the ma na ge me nt
of their fina nc e s.The  second  element  relates  solely  to  businesses.  It  invo l ved  the
efforts of a business inve s t i g a t o r. This person has four main tasks.
F i rst, he is re q u i red to confirm whether or not there is any question
of fraud or criminality invo l ved in each case. Second, the business
i n vestigator has the task of identifying any management or genera l
business problems that are likely to prevent completion of a Chapter
13 re o rganisation plan. Third, the business investigator assists deb-
t o rs  in setting  up basic  bookkeeping  sys t e m s, providing monthly
financial reports and completing tax returns as appro p r i a t e.
1 F i n a l l y,
the business investigator draws  up a report on his  findings with
recommendations as to whether or not the case should be confirmed
or dismissed. This report is submitted after the initial cre d i t o rs’ meet-
ing, but before the confirmation hearing takes place.
The third element is what the org a n i s e rs of the pro g ram refer to as a
voluntary credit re-establishment scheme. The aim of this scheme is
to help debtors who wish to regain access to prime lender cre d i t
a c h i eve this goal more quickly than would otherwise be the case. To
qualify for participation,  debtors  must complete their  Chapter 13
re o rganisation  plans  (which  may  take  3-5  ye a rs)  and  attend  the
a f o rementioned debt counselling classes. Participants are also taught
h ow to correct erro rs in their credit re p o r t s, a right under United
States legislation. On completion of re o rganisation plans, gra d u a t e s
of the pro g ram are put in touch with local banks that agree vo l u n-
tarily to re s t o re access to prime lender credit. In the case of sole
p ro p r i e t o rs and the self-employed, the banks agree to consider all
business plans submitted in good faith, without re f e rence to past
c redit history.
C u r re n t l y, about 1,500 individuals (including many sole pro p r i e t o rs )
t a ke part in the pro g ram each ye a r. Of those graduating in re c e n t
ye a rs, approximately 55% decide not to apply for credit re - e s t a b l i s h-
ment. A further 45% have their applications for credit or bank loans
accepted  whilst  only  5%  have  their  applications  rejected.  In  the
c o u rse of the nine ye a rs the credit re-establishment scheme has been
in ex i s t e n c e, a total of $ 15 million in loans and credit has been
a d vanced. Although no specific tracking study has yet to be com-
pleted, very few instances of default have been re p o r t e d .
2 A further
a c h i evement is a 50% completion rate for re o rganisation plans com-
p a red to a national ave rage of 25-30%. Those running the scheme
attribute its success to the fact that debtors are given a strong incen-
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1 Similar tasks are perfo r med du r i ng and after Initial Debtor Int e r v iews in a differe nt pro g ra m
run by the United States Bankruptcy Trustee in San Fra nc i s c o .
2 A study is, ho w e v e r, curre ntly underway to assess mo re precisely the de g ree of success enjoy-
ed by the sche me.t i ve to complete their re o rganisation plans, namely the possibility of
re-establishing access to prime lender cre d i t .
C redit counselling
C redit counselling services for the most part are non-profit educa-
tional and social service organisations whose primary objectives are
to help individuals improve their credit standings and to provide use-
ful information pertaining to credit issues. These organisations assist
clients in communicating with their cre d i t o rs in a timely manner, eli-
minating collection calls at home and work (there by avoiding law-
suits and wage garnishment), avoiding bankruptcy by establishing a
plan of re p ayment to all cre d i t o rs based upon income and living
expenses and ove rcoming the obstacles created by a negative past
c redit history. The groups in question are staffed by licensed pro f e s-
sional counsellors trained in such dive rse areas as banking, financial
planning, social work, education, family law, taxe s, real estate and
accounting. All services are offered free to the general public re g a rd-
less of income. All operating and administra t i ve costs are cove red in
part by donations.
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e n t re p re n e u rship in the
N e t h e r l a n d s
This chapter is devoted to business failures and entre p re n e u rship in
the Netherlands. The structure of this chapter is similar to the pre-
vious chapter and the situation in the Netherlands is compared with
that in the USA as far as possible. The data from the Netherlands ori-
ginate mainly from the Central Bureau for Statistics and from a publi-
cation on this topic which was based on a survey among entre p re-
n e u rs who restarted after a business failure and potential re s t a r t e rs
1.
4 . 1 B a n k r u p t cy legislation and
p ro c e d u re s
Normally a person with debts strives to pay on time. If he is unable to
do so by exception, he will request the creditor for postponement of
p ay m e n t
2. In most cases, the creditor will be inclined to agre e, for exa m-
ple to keep his customer. Sometimes the debtor continues to default or
not comply by the agreed time and the creditor can act as follows :
• do nothing;
• hold the opposing side/party liable by fax or re g i s t e red letter;
• issue a writ of summons, in which proof of default is described
and which is provided with a re q u i rement of immediate achieve-
ment. After a writ of summons the debtor can be summoned, and
the court can give a ruling, in which a claim is re c o rded. The
ruling will provide the creditor with some satisfaction, but sure l y
not the re q u i red performance;
• b a n k r u p t cy, this is only possible under certain conditions:
1 . the debtor must be in the circumstances that he has ceased to
p ay his debts;
2 . t h e re must be more than one cre d i t o r.
M o ratorium (postponement of pay m e n t )
If debts can not (all) be paid for the time being, although the debtor is
of the opinion that bankruptcy can be preve n t e d
3, a moratorium can
be requested. For this the intervention of a solicitor is needed. The
m o ratorium provides a chance to put things in order and/or to come
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1 B&A  Groep,  Klaar  voor  de  herstart?  –  Onderzoek  naar  de  omstandigheden  van  bedrijfs -
beeindigers (Ready for the restart? – Research on the circumstances of business terminators),
T he Ha g u e, May 1998.
2 R e u v e r s, M.R. Insolventie, dreiging en afweer, Sdu Jurid i s c he & Fiscale Uitgeverij, 
‘ s - G ra v e n h a ge, 1992.
3 Ondernemerswijzer 1996, De praktische gids voor elke ondernemer, Kluwer B. V., Deventer 1996.to an agreement with the cre d i t o rs. Control of assets is not lost (in con-
t rast to bankruptcy), and business can be continued. Howeve r, debts
a re frozen and do not to have be paid for the moment. Normally, the
court gives a moratorium for a certain period, appoints a trustee and
o rd e rs a meeting with cre d i t o rs. Depending on the findings during
these  meetings  and  a  possible  investigation  by  ex p e r t s,  a  definite
m o ratorium or refusal of moratorium will follow. In the latter case, the
court can pronounce bankruptcy immediately. During the mora t o r i u m
the chances of survival of the firm are examined and cre d i t o rs are
o f f e red a settlement.  This  can imply discharging part of the debts
and/or a settlement for staggered payment. If the settlement is accep-
ted by the cre d i t o rs and approved by the court, the moratorium is
ended. For the cre d i t o rs it is often better to accept an agreement, for if
an enterprise is declared bankrupt they often re c e i ve nothing at all. In
the latter situation, the available assets will go to the p re f e rential c re d-
i t o rs (see under the following para g raph Bankruptcy ) .
B a n k r u p t cy
B a n k r u p t cy can be requested by the creditor or by the debtor him-
self. Bankruptcy is a g e n e ral attachment on all property of the deb-
tor on behalf of the cre d i t o rs. Some cre d i t o rs are privileged, namely
the  ‘boedelcre d i t e u ren’  (cre d i t o rs  of  the  property)  and  secure d
d e b t s / c re d i t o rs. The first are cre d i t o rs with the right of payment of
debts made after the appointment of the trustee or the mora t o r i u m
and in co-operation with him. The trustee himself is ‘boedelcre d i-
teur’ and his fees have priority. This also applies to the wages of the
e m p l oyees who keep the business running or liquidating, and for
benefits to employees from the Industrial Insurance Board, during a
short period after the pronounced bankruptcy. Pre f e rential cre d i t o rs
and the Industrial Insurance Board are the tre a s u r y. It is their turn to
be paid, immediately after the ‘boedelcre d i t e u ren’, from the pro c e e d s
of  the  pro p e r t y.  Howeve r,  in  many  cases  nothing  or  very  little
remains to pay the other cre d i t o rs.
All previous attachments lapse once the bankruptcy is official. The
bankrupt looses control of his property and is not allowed to do busi-
ness without the permission of the trustee, a solicitor appointed as
such by court.
Who can apply for bankruptcy ?
Not only natural pers o n s, also legal persons operating as private limi-
ted companies, limited companies, partnerships and estates can be
p ronounced bankrupt. 
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• A ny creditor can apply for the bankruptcy of a natural or legal
p e rson  from  whom  he  claims  money,  goods  or  services.  The
c reditor has to use a solicitor, who presents a plea to court on
behalf of the cre d i t o r. 
• The Public  Prosecutor can  apply for  bankruptcy  in  the public
i n t e re s t .
The course of eve n t s
The court appoints a trustee and an official re c e i ver who supervises
the trustee. The trustee takes over the management of the property of
the bankrupt. Mail will be sent to the trustee. Bank and Giro accounts
will be blocked. The bankruptcy will be announced in the Gove r n m e n t
Gazette: cre d i t o rs can present their claims to the trustee within a cer-
tain period. The bankruptcy will also be re g i s t e red in the trade re g i s-
t e r. The trustee collects outstanding accounts. After a certain time, the
trustee and bankrupt make a balance: what the proceeds will be after
collecting the  outstanding  accounts and  selling the  properties  and
s t o c k s. If there is anything left to be paid to the cre d i t o rs, the trustee
will announce a cre d i t o rs’ meeting (‘ve r i f i c a t i eve rgadering’). If not, the
trustee will suggest the annulment of the bankruptcy.
The annulment of the bankruptcy
The bankruptcy can be ended in three ways :
1 . annulment because of lack of assets, none of the cre d i t o rs is paid.
At most, the treasury and Industrial Insurance Board will re c e i ve
something. The trustee’s fee re c e i ves priority;
2 . ending by settlement. During the cre d i t o rs’ meeting (ve r i f i c a t i e-
ve rgadering), the contents of the settlement conform the pro p o s a l
of the trustee are discussed;
3 . ending by liquidation. In this case there is a settlement, the trus-
tee capitalises the assets and the proceeds are divided among the
c re d i t o rs.
Most bankruptcies end in annulment because of lack of assets. A
legal  entity  ceases  to  exist,  a  natural  person,  howeve r,  can  be
summoned by his cre d i t o rs for 30 ye a rs. There f o re an agre e m e n t
with the cre d i t o rs is better for a natural person. After the bankruptcy
the cre d i t o rs are no longer allowed to summon the debtor.
The cre d i t o rs’ meeting (Ve r i f i c a t i eve rg a d e r i n g )
Only when the balance of debts and properties is enough to pay the
c re d i t o rs, will a cre d i t o rs’ meeting be held. Cre d i t o rs submit their
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with the bankrupt. In this way a list of provisional and disputed
claims is made and deposited for inspection by the court. During the
meeting, only those cre d i t o rs included on the list may speak. They
m ay, as may the trustee, challenge the claims of other cre d i t o rs. The
Public Prosecutor tries to make the cre d i t o rs come to an agre e m e n t ,
if he does not succeed, the court will decide. Claims that are not chal-
lenged, are recognised. During the meeting, claims that take priority
will be re c o rded, the ‘boedelcre d i t e u ren’ and pre f e rential cre d i t o rs
(see above ) .
The settlement
In case of a settlement, the cre d i t o rs will settle for a partial or stag-
g e red payment of their claims. This is only possible after the inve n-
tory cre d i t o rs (‘boedelcre d i t e u ren’) and pre f e rential cre d i t o rs have
been paid. A draft of the agreement is submitted for inspection be-
f o re the meeting and the trustee notifies the cre d i t o rs presenting a
claim. It is also possible that the bankrupt puts the settlement for-
wa rd during the meeting. The non-privileged cre d i t o rs are allowed to
vote on the settlement, absentees are re g a rded as dissentients. A
majority of two - t h i rds of the cre d i t o rs, re p resenting three-quarter of
all  non-privileged  cre d i t o rs  is  a  pre re q u i s i t e.  If  the  settlement  is
a g reed on, the court has to homologate it. Once the settlement has
been accepted the  application  for bankruptcy  ends  and  no more
claims may be made against the debtor. Cre d i t o rs no longer have any
c l a i m s. Most re m a r kable about a settlement is the fact that those who
voted against the settlement are also committed, including the absen-
t e e s.
I n s o l ve n cy
If no settlement is agreed on during the cre d i t o rs’ meeting, insolve n-
cy becomes a fact. The trustee sells the inventory and divides the
p roceeds among the cre d i t o rs. After a distribution list is made up,
b a n k r u p t cy ends. A bankrupt private limited company is dissolve d ;
s h a re h o l d e rs are liable only up to the amount of their share s, which
t h ey lose. A natural person is liable to re c e i ve claims for 30 ye a rs
after the bankruptcy pro c e e d i n g s.
P re f e rential cre d i t o rs (Separa t i s t e n )
P re f e rential cre d i t o rs are those cre d i t o rs who are less concerned by
the bankruptcy. They can try to cash their claim independently, and
often have the means to do so. They are the mortgagee, the collater-
al holder and the cre d i t - g i ver (for example the bank), who have as
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the right, to sell the real estate in public. If the proceeds exceed his
claim, the rest goes to the bankrupt’s estate. If the trustee agre e s, the
real estate can be sold priva t e l y.
The thro u g h s t a r t
The ‘throughstart’ is a ‘technical bankruptcy ’
1 used for a limited lia-
bility company. An, in principal, sound enterprise goes bankrupt to
restart on a re o rganised financial basis and with a drastically re d u c-
ed staff. The entre p reneur and his consultants are of the opinion that
the economic activities of the firm are and can be pro f i t a b l e, but will
lead to bankruptcy involving a socially unacceptable loss of capital
and employment if continued without changes. 
Recent deve l o p m e n t s
Since 1 December 1998 a new law concerning debt restructuring of
n a t u ral persons – including private persons and self employed – is in
p l a c e. The judge can impose a debt restructuring schedule for debtor
and cre d i t o rs if no agreement about a voluntarily debt re s t r u c t u r i n g
can be reached between debtor and cre d i t o rs. This provides the deb-
tor with more opportunities to start a new business ve n t u re after
h aving settled a debt restructuring schedule.
4 . 2 Business failures and surviva l
4 . 2 . 1 Business failure s
The number of bankruptcies has varied strongly in the course of
t i m e. The number of bankruptcies in 1993 and 1994 we re almost
double the number of 1990. The number of bankruptcies is re l a t e d
to the increasing number of enterprises and the state of the Dutch
e c o n o my. The slowd own in the economy in 1992 and 1993 led – with
a time lag – to a considerable increase in the number of bankrupt-
c i e s. The number of bankruptcies per 10,000 enterprises also shows
the volatility with a strong increase in the period from 1990 till 1993
and 1994 and a considerable decrease in the period afterwa rd s. The
ave rage liability per bankrupt enterprise decreased considerably fro m
ƒ 808,000 in 1992 to ƒ 688,000 in 1996. But one has to realise that
these ave rage liabilities can be notably different in certain ye a rs if
one or a few bankruptcies invo l ve very high liabilities.
The ave rage debt after bankruptcy proceedings was almost ƒ 623,000
in 1996. This means that only about 10% of the liabilities are paid off
f rom the proceeds of the liquidation. There is quite a big differe n c e
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1 Mooyen, W.E., Doorstarten in en buiten fa i l l i s s e me nt, A c c o u n t a n t - A d v i s e u r, nr. 5, May 1996.b e t ween sole pro p r i e t o rs and legal entities. The ave rage debt re m a i-
ning after bankruptcy pro c e d u res was ƒ 300,000 for sole pro p r i e t o rs
and ƒ 850,000 for legal entities. About 30% of the total bankrupt
enterprises (including sole pro p r i e t o rs and legal entities) had less
than ƒ 100,000 debt remaining and more than 85% of the bankrupt
enterprises had less than 1 million Guilders debt re m a i n i n g .
A comparison between the situation in the Netherlands and the USA
s h ows a similar pattern of increasing numbers of bankruptcies to the
1 9 91 – 1993 period and a decrease in the later period. and one has
to keep in mind that the economic slowd own in the USA took place
in the 1990 – 1991 period. The number of failures in the USA also
includes voluntary withdrawal with unpaid debts and re c e i ve rs h i p s
and re o rg a n i s a t i o n s. Fu r t h e r m o re, enterprises without employees are
not included  in the  Small Business Ad m i n i s t ration  database (e. g .
E u rostat reports 22 million enterprise units in 1991 in the USA, but
this  figure  re p resents  the  number  of  tax  reporting  units  and  an
enterprise can make numerous tax returns if it has different sub-
s i d i a i r i e s,  branch  offices,  establishments  in  other  states,  etc. ) .
T h e re f o re  the  number  of  failures  per  10,000  enterprises  in  the
Netherlands is not comparable with the USA. Ac c o rding to Dutch
f i g u res the number of enterprises without employees is about the
same as the number of enterprises with employe e s. On the assump-
tion of a number of enterprises about double in comparison with that
of the SBA figure s, it appears that the number of business failures in
relation to the number of enterprises is lower in the USA than in the
N e t h e r l a n d s. The ave rage liability per failure is higher in the USA
than in the Netherlands, and it should be mentioned that the figure s
vary more strongly in the USA in the course of time in comparison
with the Dutch deve l o p m e n t .
Table 4.1 Number of bankruptcies in the Ne t he r l a nd s, 1990-1997
Number of Av e ra ge lia b i l i t y Number of Number of bankruptcie s
b a n k r u p t c ie s per fa i l u re (guilde r s ) * e nterprises  per 10,000 ent e r p r i s e s
1990  2 , 8 2 9 552,981  5 1
1991  3 , 3 9 7 568,829  6 0
1992  4,369  808,000  583,146  7 5
1993  5 , 5 1 2 595,888  9 3
1994  5,333  744,000  607,606  8 8
1995  4 , 7 8 3 615,922  7 8
1996  4,534  688,000  620,135  7 3
1997  4 , 4 1 3 646,260  6 8
* This amo u nt inc l udes all lia b i l i t ies befo re liquida t ion and the payme nt of debts fro m
t he pro c e e d s.
S o u rce: Cent ral Bureau for Statistic s.
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Almost half of the bankruptcies are enterprises which have ex i s t e d
for less than 5 ye a rs (see table 4.1
1). Quite a lot of bankruptcies con-
sist  of  enterprises  which  did  not  survive  the  first  three  ye a rs.
A l t o g e t h e r, about 70 % of the bankruptcies appear to be enterprises
which are less than 10 ye a rs old.
In general it can be concluded that the differences in age cohorts is
rather similar for the distinguished sectors. The sectors of hotels, re s-
t a u rants and cafes, transport and communication and the sector of the
so called other services have a re l a t i vely high share of bankruptcies in
enterprises which are less than 3 ye a rs old. This observation is also
valid for the period up to five ye a rs. These sectors have a pattern ra t h-
er similar to that of other sectors when it comes to the share of bank-
ruptcies of enterprises which have existed for more than 10 ye a rs.
The Dutch pattern of bankruptcies by age cohort is rather similar to
the situation in the USA. In the Netherlands there is a slightly higher
s h a re of bankruptcies in the age cohorts of 3 ye a rs or less and 5 ye a rs
or less. In the Netherlands a smaller share of bankrupt enterprises
a re older than 10 ye a rs in comparison with the USA .
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Table 4.2 P ro p o r t ion of bankruptcies by age cohort in the Ne t he r l a nds in 1995 (%)
Age of Ho t e l s, F i na nc e,
b u s i ne s s Ma nu - cafes and Tra nsport, and i ns u ra nc e, O t he r
in years Ag r ic u l t u re fa c t u r i ng C o ns t r uc t io n Tra de re s t a u ra nt s c o m mu n ic a t io n real estate s e r v ic e s To t a l
1 or less  2.2  4 . 8 3 . 6 5 . 6 5 . 7 6 . 2 2 . 9 5 . 6 4 . 6
2 8 . 9 9 . 7 1 1 . 6 1 0 . 5 1 2 . 6 1 3 . 3 9 . 7 1 5 . 0 1 0 . 8
3 1 4 . 4 1 1 . 0 1 0 . 8 1 3 . 1 1 6 . 7 1 3 . 8 1 1 . 4 1 1 . 9 1 2 . 4
3 or less 2 5 . 5 2 5 . 5 2 6 . 0 2 9 . 2 3 5 . 0 3 3 . 3 2 4 . 0 3 2 . 0 2 7 . 8
4 6 . 7 9 . 7 9 . 5 9 . 4 6 . 1 1 1 . 1 1 0 . 3 1 2 . 5 9 . 5
5 1 0 . 0 7 . 3 8 . 9 8 . 3 8 . 5 9 . 3 1 1 . 7 5 . 0 8 . 9
5 or less 4 3 . 2 4 2 . 5 4 4 . 4 4 6 . 9 4 9 . 6 5 3 . 7 4 6 . 0 4 9 . 5 4 6 . 2
6 1 5 . 6 6 . 8 8 . 6 6 . 4 7 . 7 8 . 0 9 . 1 6 . 3 7 . 7
7 6 . 7 7 . 3 5 . 3 5 . 2 3 . 7 4 . 4 7 . 5 5 . 0 5 . 8
8 5 . 6 4 . 6 3 . 4 4 . 3 2 . 8 6 . 7 5 . 4 1 . 9 4 . 5
9 1 . 1 4 . 4 2 . 5 4 . 8 3 . 7 0 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 4 3 . 9
1 0 3 . 3 2 . 6 3 . 4 3 . 3 2 . 4 1 . 3 2 . 7 5 . 0 3 . 0
6 to 10 3 2 . 2 2 5 . 6 2 3 . 1 2 4 . 0 2 0 . 3 2 1 . 0 2 9 . 2 2 3 . 0 2 5 . 1
Over 10 2 5 . 6 3 1 . 9 3 2 . 5 2 9 . 1 3 0 . 1 2 5 . 3 2 4 . 8 2 7 . 5 2 8 . 7
S o u rce: Cent ral Bureau for Statistic s.
1 T he distribution in the table is based on the data from enterprises of which the age is kno w n .
For about 20% of the bankrupt enterprises the age cohort is unkno w n .4 . 3 Obstacles to Po s t - Fa i l u re
E n t re p reneurial Ac t i v i t y
This section will pay attention to obstacles perc e i ved by entre p re-
n e u rs trying to start again after business failure
1. The term ‘perc e i ve d
by entre p re n e u rs’ is related to the fact that the re s e a rch and analys i s
is based on a survey among entre p re n e u rs. The survey was carried
out among 600 entre p re n e u rs who had terminated their business. In
this survey 69 entre p re n e u rs we re included who had ex p e r i e n c e d
b a n k r u p t cy. The analysis in this part is based on the responses of
those 69 entre p re n e u rs. 
One has to realise that this section pays attention to the results of a
s u r vey among Dutch entre p re n e u rs and that the questions raised in
the survey we re from a somewhat different nature than the inve s t i-
gation in the USA. More ove r, the American re s e a rch on obstacles wa s
mainly  based on  interviews  with  re p re s e n t a t i ves  of  intermediairy
o rg a n i s a t i o n s.  There f o re,  a  full  fledged  comparison  between  the
Netherlands and the USA is not possible.
In 90% of the cases the entre p re n e u rs who went bankrupt perc e i ve d
this as a (very) radical event. One third of the bankrupt entre p re n e u rs
mentioned the debts and one fifth mentioned the loss of income as the
most important factor which made the termination a radical eve n t .
In 25% of the cases the social environment of bankrupt entre p re-
n e u rs reacted (very) negatively to the termination of the enterprise,
in 30% of the cases it was neither negative nor positive and in 45%
of the cases the reactions we re positive. 
M o re than 50% of the bankrupt entre p re n e u rs stated that it is diffi-
cult or very difficult to start again in the Netherlands after business
f a i l u re. The existence of debts, difficult access to bank credit and the
financial risks of entre p re n e u rship we re mentioned by bankrupt en-
t re p re n e u rs as factors for not starting an enterprise again. About 40%
of the bankrupt entre p re n e u rs indicated that it was easy to start again
after bankruptcy.
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1 T he main source for this part are the results from a survey amo ng ent re p re neurs who started
again after business fa i l u re. This info r ma t ion can be fo u nd in the public a t io ns: B&A Gro e p ,
Klaar voor de herstart? – Onderzoek naar de omstandigheden van bedrijfsbeëindigers (Ready for
the restart? – Research on the circumstances of business terminators, The Ha g u e, May 1998
a nd Economisch Bureau Ing, Ondernemers op herhaling (Entrepreneurs on retraining exer -
c i s e s ), Ams t e rdam, 1998.N ext, a comparison is made between the obstacles experienced by
e n t re p re n e u rs – who did start again after business failure – in star-
ting their previous enterprise and their current enterprise. About half
of  the  entre p re n e u rs  indicate  that  they  experienced  no  pro b l e m s
either when starting their current enterprise or their previous enter-
p r i s e. Internal enterprise problems like finding customers, competition
and administra t i ve obstacles we re less important in starting their cur-
rent enterprise than in their previous enterprise. External factors like
access to start capital and obstacles in legislation and pro c e d u re s
we re more important in starting their current enterprise than in start-
ing their previous enterprise. 
F i n a l l y, a comparison is made between the situation in the USA and
the Netherlands. It has to be kept in mind that the perception in the
U SA is based on information from intermediairy organisations and in
the  Netherlands  from  entre p re n e u rs  themselve s.  This  certainly
affects the tendencies and perceptions as presented here. It appears
that individuals in the United States who have been declared bank-
rupt do not face unsurmountable obstacles when starting again. The
available evidence suggests that there are few barriers of any gre a t
s i g n i f i c a n c e. The main obstacle is that those individuals will have
restricted access to the first-tier market for loan capital and credit. In
the American situation there is also  some truth  to the view that
h aving experience of business failure is seen within certain circles as
a positive factor if lessons have been learned as to what mistakes to
avoid and how better to solve pro b l e m s. In the majority of cases
Dutch entre p re n e u rs who have experienced bankruptcy, state that it
is difficult or very difficult to start again. Obstacles are the ex i s t e n c e
of debts, difficult access to bank credit and the financial risks of en-
t re p re n e u rship.  Neve r t h e l e s s,  40%  of  the entre p re n e u rs  indicated
that it was easy to start again after bankruptcy. About 50% of those
that  actually  started  again  indicated  that  they  experienced  no
p roblems either at starting their current enterprise or at their pre-
vious enterprise. Where there we re pro b l e m s, external pro b l e m s, like
access to capital, we re perc e i ved as more important than internal
p roblems  when  comparing  starting  their  current  enterprise  and
starting the previous business ve n t u re. 
T h e re are some important differences between the Netherlands and
the USA when comparing the access to credit and access to ve n t u re
c a p i t a l :
• It seems that in general Dutch entre p re n e u rs who start again after
business failure are not using the second-tier market for ex t e r n a l
financing of business ve n t u re s. Even if Dutch entre p re n e u rs are
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evaluate  the  second-tier  market  as  too  ex p e n s i ve,  while  his
American colleague will evaluate it as an opportunity for finan-
cing his new business ve n t u re.
• Ve n t u re capital in the Netherlands is mainly focused on manage-
ment-buy-out (or -in), expanding enterprises and certain sectors
( e.g. high tech, IT, biotechnology). Ve n t u re capital funds are not
very interested in providing equity capital to starting entre p re-
n e u rs. There f o re, access to ve n t u re capital is very difficult any way
for entre p re n e u rs who want to start again.
4 . 4 Po s t - f a i l u re Start-Ups
The survey mentioned previously among 69 entre p re n e u rs who we n t
bankrupt indicates that 31% of those entre p re n e u rs actually started
an enterprise again. Another 37% have stated that they have thought
about it and/or think that they will try to set up a business again
sometime in the future. This group is called potential re s t a r t e rs.
The re s t a r t e rs can be divided in two groups: the ones where only the
enterprise went bankrupt and the ones who personnally went bank-
rupt. About 40%  of the  entre p re n e u rs  where only the  enterprise
went bankrupt started again and about 25% belong to the potential
re s t a r t e rs. About 20% of the entre p re n e u rs started again after going
p e rsonally bankrupt and about 40% are so called potential re s t a r t e rs. 
It seems that the Dutch entre p re n e u rs who start again a new busi-
ness ve n t u re have learned from their previous ex p e r i e n c e s. They are
m o re realistic and have a better perception about their possibilities
and opportunities and also about the obstacles and constra i n t s. They
h ave also more experience with customers and suppliers and the
potential for external financing of the business ve n t u re. In combina-
tion with the increased management experience and the prudential
a p p roach of the new business ve n t u re, this provides good possibili-
ties for a more successful business ve n t u re than the previous one.
Comparing the survey results in the USA and the Netherlands a simi-
lar pattern can be observed. In both countries the survey results indi-
cate  that  a  considerable  number of  the  entre p re n e u rs who  we n t
bankrupt did start a new enterprise again. In the Netherlands this
p e rcentage is 31%, but in the USA it is considerably higher at 47%.
Both in the USA and the Netherlands the new enterprises we re, in
g e n e ral, smaller than the previous enterprises which went bankrupt.
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This report ex p l o res various issues relating to business failure and
e n t re p re n e u rship  in  European  countries  and  in  particular  the
Netherlands and the USA .
As far as bankruptcies and failures in European countries and the
U SA goes, the following conclusions can be draw n :
• The common conception that bankruptcies are weakly pro cyc l i c a l
is supported by time series analysis over the 16-year period 1980-
1995. The number of bankruptcies surges in a depression, with a
one year lag, but does not fall back to its original level when the
e c o n o my re c ove rs. The current rise of bankruptcies is stro n g l y
c o r related with the economic slowd own of the early 1990s. In the
U SA the surge in bankruptcies, with a one year time lag, in a
period of serious economic slowd own is also evident. Howeve r, in
the USA the number of bankruptcies related to the number of
enterprises does fall back to the original leve l .
• Very small enterprises (i.e. those with up to 9 employees) are less
b a n k r u p t cy - p rone than larger enterprises.
• Businesses in which the owner is personally liable for all debts are
less bankruptcy - p rone than the re s t .
• Statistically speaking, bankruptcies account for some 15% of clo-
s u re s. However the statistics on asset and job losses from bank-
ruptcies are biased. They fail to capture job losses where wo r ke rs
we re  fired  before  the  bankruptcy  pro c e d u re  commenced,  and
asset losses where claims we re dropped because of asset-insuffi-
c i e n cy.
The re s e a rch in the USA leads to the following conclusions:
• Perhaps the most important finding of the re s e a rch conducted wa s
that persons who have a previous association with business fail-
u re in the United States are able, legally and pra c t i c a l l y, to start
again within a re l a t i vely short period of time. Fu r t h e r m o re, ev i-
dence exists suggesting that a significant proportion of pers o n s
p reviously invo l ved in a business that has failed – perhaps even a
majority of such persons – do start again. These conclusions apply
as much to sole pro p r i e t o rs and the self-employed as they do to
p e rsons who have had a previous association with limited part-
n e rships or incorporated companies that failed.
• The factors that contribute to the observed picture are many and
varied. The most significant are the legal fra m ework, an absence
of  stigma re l a t i ve to  that  which  is  often encountered  in other
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States and ready access to a sub-prime lending and credit marke t .
It should, howeve r, be noted that the last of these four factors has
a negative side. This relates to a risk of irresponsible borrow i n g
and high interest rates for those who seek finance from this seg-
ment of the market. Indeed, high rates of interest charged by sub-
prime lenders perhaps re p resent the most significant barrier to
p o s t - f a i l u re entre p reneurial activity.
Comparing the situation in the Netherlands and the USA concerning
the issues related to bankruptcies and failures and obstacles for an
e n t re p reneur to start again after business failure leads to the fol-
l owing conclusions:
• A comparison between the situation in the Netherlands and the
U SA shows a similar pattern of increasing numbers of bankrupt-
cies in the 1991–1993 period and a decrease in the later period.
and one has to keep in mind that the economic slowd own in the
U SA took place in the 1990–1991 period. It appears that the num-
ber of business failures related to the number of enterprises is
l ower in the USA than in the Netherlands. The ave rage liability per
f a i l u re is higher in the USA than in the Netherlands, and it has to
be mentioned that the figures vary more strongly in the USA in the
c o u rse of time in comparison with the Dutch deve l o p m e n t .
• The Dutch pattern of bankruptcies by age cohort is rather similar
to the situation in the USA. In the Netherlands there is a slightly
higher share of bankruptcies in the age cohorts of 3 ye a rs or less
and 5 ye a rs or less. In the Netherlands a smaller share of bank-
rupt enterprises are older than 10 ye a rs in comparison with the
U SA .
• A comparison is made between the obstacles to post-failure en-
t re p reneurial activity in the USA and the Netherlands. It appears
that individuals in the United States who declared bankruptcy do
not face unsurmountable obstacles when starting again. The main
obstacle is that those individuals will have restricted access to the
f i rst-tier market for loan capital and credit. In the American situ-
ation there is also some truth in the view that having ex p e r i e n c e
of business failure is seen within certain circles as a positive fac-
tor if lessons have been learned what mistakes to avoid and how
better to solve pro b l e m s. In the majority of cases Dutch entre p re-
n e u rs who have experienced bankruptcy, state that it is difficult or
very difficult to start again. Obstacles are the existence of debts,
difficult access to bank credit and the financial risks of entre p re-
n e u rship. Neve r t h e l e s s, 40% of the entre p re n e u rs indicated that it
was easy to start again after bankruptcy. About 50% of the ones
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p roblems  neither when  starting  their current  enterprise  nor in
their  previous  enterprise.  When  there we re  pro b l e m s,  ex t e r n a l
p roblems like access to capital we re perc e i ved as more important
than  internal  problems  when  comparing  starting  their  curre n t
enterprise and the previous business ve n t u re.
• Comparing the survey results about post-failure start-ups in the
U SA and the Netherlands a similar pattern can be observed. In
both  countries  the  survey  results  indicate  that  a  considera b l e
number of the entre p re n e u rs who went bankrupt did start a new
enterprise again. In the Netherlands this percentage is 31%, but it
is considerably higher in the USA with 47%. Both in the USA and
the Netherlands the new enterprises we re in general smaller than
the previous enterprises which had gone bankrupt.
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